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In retrospect, for Marvin Arrington, which law school he
attended made a significant difference in his career. Arrington
served for many years on the Atlanta city council and ran
unsuccessfully for mayor while maintaining a highly successful law
practice. He is now a judge in the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia. He asserts that, as he began his political career, one of his
most important sources of support, including financial and other
contributions, was the friends he made during law school.'
Arrington's story would seem to be a pedestrian tale of provincial
success, except for one thing. Marvin Arrington is African
American. He graduated from Emory University Law School
("ELS") in 1967. He was among the first African-American
* J.D., Wisconsin (2006), Ph.D., History, Vanderbilt (1996). This project began
because Woodruff Professor of Law Martha Fineman had the good sense to see its
importance. During my first year of work on the project, her Feminism and Legal
Theory Project paid my salary.
1. Interview by Odini Nwakuche with Marvin Arrington, in Atlanta, Ga. (March 16,
2007). Arrington's admission to Emory Law School ("ELS") in 1965 as a transfer student
from Howard Law School was not the result of a formal affirmative action policy.
Arrington was home from Howard for the summer after his first year of law school and
chose to study at the ELS library. Dean Ben F. Johnson, Jr., saw him there, asked him
why he was in the law library, and encouraged him to apply as a transfer student. See id.
See also John D. Thomas, A Legal Precedent, EMORY MAG., Aug. 1998 (story describing
circumstances of Arrington's arrival at Emory Law School). Arrington remains a useful
example for an article about affirmative action. The very next year, Dean Johnson would
create an affirmative action program at ELS called Pre-Start. See infra sec. IV. The issues
in the current debate include the motives of law school administrators and of African-
American law students, making Johnson's reasoning highly relevant. See infra, notes
138-40 and accompanying text.
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graduates of Emory's law school, indeed of the university as a
whole.
Affirmative action in law school admissions has generated
substantial controversy in recent years. The decision of the United
States Supreme Court upholding the affirmative action policy at the
University of Michigan Law School 2 seems to have increased, rather
than diminished, the controversy. 3 Dissenting in that case, Grutter
v. Bollinger, Justice Clarence Thomas delivered a withering critique
in which he characterized the Michigan law school's affirmative
action program as an "aesthetic," 4 similar to its choice of chairs for
its classrooms - far short of the compelling state interest that any
unit of government in the United States must show to justify any
official racial classification. 5
Emory's experience offers a unique opportunity to examine the
history of affirmative action in law school admissions. Asserting
that Emory never had an explicit policy against admitting African
Americans, the Chair of Emory's Board of Trustees and the Dean of
its Law School filed suit in 1962 to strike down a Georgia statute that
would have rescinded Emory's tax exemption if the university
began admitting African Americans. 6 Four years later, with funding
from the Field Foundation of New York, the same Dean, Ben F.
Johnson, Jr., created Pre-Start. 7 The purpose of Pre-Start was to
allow African-American college graduates to demonstrate their
aptitude for the study of law by taking full-fledged law classes
during the summer. Those who earned a cumulative grade of
seventy or above were eligible to matriculate at ELS as regular
students the following fall and received academic credit for the
summer courses.
By definition, Pre-Start students' admission credentials,
particularly their scores on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT),
fell below Emory's usual minimum. 8 Johnson repeatedly referred to
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
3. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). ("Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial
preferences in state educational institutions are impermissible, or even a clear
anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are OK,
today's Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the
controversy and the litigation.").
4. Id. at 354 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a reading of this dissent that reconciles
Thomas' opposition to affirmative action with his support for racial equality, see Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Thomas?: The Grutter v. Bollinger
Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787 (2004-2005).
5. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353.
6. Emory v. Nash, 127 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. 1962) (reh'g. denied, Oct. 1, 1962). See infra sec.
IV for discussion of this case, and the complete story of Pre-Start.
7. See infra sec. IV.
8. Dean Johnson explained that the LSAT scores of the first Pre-Start participants
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Pre-Start as, inter alia, a test of the LSAT's ability to predict the
performance of African Americans in law school. 9 On Johnson's
view, the LSAT was a miserable failure for this purpose. The more
important point of Pre-Start, however, was to increase the number
of African-American attorneys in the South. Pre-Start ended in 1972
with Dean Johnson asserting that the number of applications from
African Americans had grown to the point that it was no longer
necessary.10
This article demonstrates that Pre-Start is a useful historical case
study for refraining the current debate over affirmative action in law
school admissions. In effect, I perform post-hoc strict scrutiny on
Pre-Start, finding that it meets not only the criteria that the majority
articulated in Grutter, but even the far more exacting standard that
Justice Thomas articulated in his Grutter dissent - racial
classifications are permissible only as necessary for the state to
perform its role as a "bulwark against anarchy."11 Affirmative
action at southern law schools functions as a bulwark against the
anarchy of white supremacy. Increasing the number of African-
American attorneys in the South functions as a form of self-help, for
African Americans and for southerners generally.
In terms of the most recent cases addressing affirmative action,
and in terms of the debate over the effects of affirmative action, the
previously inaccessible story of Pre-Start provides new insights that
should help all concerned - prospective law students, law school
administrators, policy makers, and judges - think about the issues
in new ways. This article makes no specific recommendations about
what affirmative action policies, if any, law schools should have.
However, this article does provide empirical evidence for an
example that helps broaden the range of possible options and
refocuses the debate over how to evaluate the effects of affirmative
action programs.
Section I of this article provides a broad overview of the issues
in the current debate and how Pre-Start fits into the debate. Section
II describes the current state of the law regarding affirmative action
in education. Section III explains how Pre-Start worked, and why
Emory Law School Dean Ben Johnson chose to create the program in
the first place. With the conceptual, legal, and empirical
averaged 369, as opposed to 545 for the class as a whole that year. See infra notes 148-149
and accompanying text for fuller discussion.
9. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
10. Letter, Feb. 19, 1971, Ben F. Johnson, Jr., to Leslie Dunbar, Executive Director,
Field Foundation, in folder, "Emory Law School Spring 1976," box 2T2, Field
Foundation Records, Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin
[hereinafter Field Foundation Records].
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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components in place, it is possible in Section IV to compare Pre-Start
to the elements that the Supreme Court has identified for a legal
affirmative action program. Finally, Section V focuses specifically
on the LSAT as a key element in the debate over race and admission
to and performance in law school.
I. The Current Debate
A. Affirmative Action: Bad for African Americans?
By disparaging the LSAT as a predictor of African Americans'
performance in law school, Ben F. Johnson, Jr., differed with the
recent claim by Professor Richard Sander that the LSAT is a
reasonably reliable predictor of the performance of all law students,
including African Americans. 12 According to Sander, we lack good
information about the effects of affirmative action policies in
American universities. He claims to provide such information, at
least about law schools if not universities as a whole, based on his
analysis of data from a study of bar passage rates conducted by the
Law School Admission Council. 13
According to Sander, his statistical analysis demonstrates that
affirmative action programs tend to launch African-American
students into much better law schools than they would otherwise
get admitted to. Because of their relatively poor credentials
compared to other students, they struggle, perform badly, have
badly elevated rates of attrition, and are significantly less likely to
pass the bar.1 4 In general, Pre-Start at Emory provides a useful
perspective for evaluating Sander's claim that affirmative action in
law school admissions does more harm than good to African-
12. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 412, 418 (2004). A number of authors have written in
response to Sander. Stanford Law Review published several such responses, plus
Sander's ripostes to them, in a subsequent issue of volume 57, 1807. The argument of
the present article most closely resembles that of David B. Wilkins. David B. Wilkins, A
Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915,
1918 (2005) ("Although one can argue that black students who [fail to graduate from law
school] would have been better off if they had never been admitted to law school in the
first place.... if those blacks who do become lawyers benefit significantly from
affirmative action, then it is hard to see why blacks as a group are worse off simply
because a higher percentage of blacks fail the bar than whites.") (emphasis in original).
Compare with supra note 1. See also Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me
a River: The Limits of "A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, " 7
AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1 (2005).
13. Sander, supra note 12, at 414.
14. Id. at 371-72, passim.
[Vol. 5
American law students.15  As Sander puts it, "Perhaps most
remarkably, a strong case can be made that in the legal education
system as a whole, racial preferences end up producing fewer black
lawyers each year than would be produced by a race-blind
system." 16
Statistical analysis such as Sander's can be useful for
determining what large groups of people actually do. It is
significantly less useful for understanding people's motives and
aspirations. 17 One obvious problem with statistical analysis is that a
commitment to it tends to shape the kinds of questions one
examines,18 and the types of information one is willing to count as
relevant.19 As Sander and some of his critics agree, however, it is
important to provide the best information possible to African
Americans who are considering law school so that they may make
15. Id. at 371 ("What I find and describe in this Article is a system of racial
preferences that, in one realm or another, produces more harms than benefits for its
putative beneficiaries."). See also Richard H. Sander, What Do We Know about Lawyers'
Lives? The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C.L. REV. 1755, 1759 (2006) ("The
use of large preferences by firms leads to disparities in expectations and performance
that ultimately hurt the intended beneficiaries of those preferences.").
16. Sander, supra note 12, at 373. But see Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The
Black-White Test Score Gap: An Introduction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 37
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, eds., 1998) ("In some cases, advocates of color-
blind admissions go further and argue that racial preferences are actually a disservice to
their nominal beneficiaries, who would be better off at less demanding institutions. If
this were true, racial preferences would certainly be hard to defend. But it seems to be
false.").
17. See Sander, supra note 12, at 422-23 (explaining that the same statistical
generalization can be very useful in predicting aggregate outcomes but nearly useless in
predicting individual outcomes). See also JOEL DREYFUS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE
BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 20 (Harcourt College Publishers 1979)
(describing admissions process at UC Davis medical school that gave rise to Regents of
the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in terms that foreground the disparity
between what a statistical representation shows, and what the faculty on the admissions
committee describe themselves as having done).
18. See Sander, supra note 12, at 425 n.165 ("My own, unpublished research suggests
that a talented young person of any race growing up in a low-to-modest socioeconomic
environment has a better chance of reaching the upper-middle class through ordinary
capitalism than through a graduate degree, such as a law degree. If this is true, it
suggests that a key goal of our public education and university system-to promote
opportunity and bring talent to the fore - is not working."). But this assumes that the
only way to measure opportunity and talent is through class mobility, which, one
suspects, Sander measures primarily or exclusively in terms of income. In doing so,
Sander hypostatizes his own goals and preferences into generalizations about the social
order.
19. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 12, at 369 ("These effects are interesting and
important, but I give them short shrift for the most part because they are hard to
measure and there is not enough data available that is thorough or objective enough for
my purposes.").
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the most informed choices possible about whether to go to law
school at all, and for those who have the good fortune to choose
among admitting institutions, which law school to go to. 20
Statistical analysis can help to inform such choices by providing
comparisons of many institutions, assuming that the data offers a
reliable representation of those institutions, and the results of
choices among them, to begin with.21 Like statistical analysis,
historical research tends to shape the researchers' choices of
questions to ask and evidence to accept. Historical accounts
typically focus, for various reasons, on a single institution or small
group of institutions. By definition, therefore, they are
unrepresentative in the statistical sense. But, also by definition,
leadership is statistically unrepresentative. In order to be truly in
the lead, one must be ahead of the pack.
Emory is an important and instructive example of leadership in
racial integration and affirmative action because its administrators
took the lead among southern research universities with voluntary
desegregation, 22 and with Pre-Start. The story of why Emory's
20. Ian Ayers & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black
Lawyers? 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005); Sander, supra note 12, at 481-82.
21. That statistical data can create as many controversies as it resolves is obvious
from competing rankings of law schools. The most famous, from U.S. News & World
Report, indicates that, for 2008, Yale is #1 while Harvard and Stanford tie for #2, Emory
is #22, and Wisconsin (where I attended law school) is #36. http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/grad/law/search (last visited April 18, 2008).
By contrast, a ranking scheme by the Thomas M. Cooley School of Law that evaluates
graduates more heavily than admittees produces some results that differ markedly.
Harvard is now #1, but Yale drops to #6 and Stanford to #22, while Wisconsin rises to
#21 and Emory is not in the top 50 at all. See Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Judging
the Law Schools: Overall Rankings 2007, http://www.cooley.edu/rankings/overall
2007.htm#rank (last visited Apr. 13, 2008). Thomas E. Brennan and Don Le Duc, in
explaining Cooley's method, compare the U.S. News & World Report approach to ranking
football teams on the basis of draft picks and the opinions of coaches and sportswriters,
but disregarding performance in actual games. See Thomas E. Brennan & Don Le Duc,
General Introduction, http://www.cooley.edu/rankings/intro-9th (last visited Apr. 9,
2008). According to the Consus Group, Emory ranks 35th among American law schools,
while the University of Georgia ranks 37th. See The Consus Group, Composite Law
School Rankings (2007), http://www.consusgroup.com/news/rankings/law-schools/
law-schools.asp (last visited Apr. 9. 2008). In explaining their method, the Consus
Group asserts, "[wlhile many law school rankings fluctuate wildly from year to year,
TCG's comprehensive methodology produces a stable, accurate picture of America's
best law schools." Id. The Consus Group's rankings come closer to those of U.S. News &
World Report: Yale is first, Harvard second, Stanford third, Wisconsin 38th. Id.
22. But see Melissa Fitzsimons Kean, "At a Most Uncomfortable Speed": The
Desegregation of the South's Private Universities, 1945-1964 (2000) ( Ph.D. dissertation,
Rice University). Kean disputes the claim that racial integration of Duke, Emory, Rice,
Tulane, and Vanderbilt was as voluntary as those institutions' constituents often claim.
Id. at 1. I do not disagree with Kean's analysis, especially her point that these
institutions desegregated only because of the various external pressures that African
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administrators did so, and with what consequences for the
institution,23 provide the primary evidentiary basis for this article.
The story of Dean Ben Johnson's reasoning for pursuing integration
while many of his peers fought it, and for starting an affirmative
action program at Emory Law, creates an opportunity to rethink the
terms of the current debate about affirmative action, in law schools
particularly, but in American higher education more generally as
well.24
While African-American and other applicants to American law
schools may wish to use Sander's data in evaluating what schools to
apply to and attend, they may also wish to know about the history
Americans created via the civil rights movement. However, the simple fact remains that
Emory administrators, faced with such pressure, took positive steps to bring integration
about, rather than fighting it tooth and nail. Compare Emory's experience to Vanderbilt.
PAUL K. CONKIN, GONE WITH THE IVY: A BIOGRAPHY OF VANDERBILT UNWERSITY 539
(University of Tennessee Press 1985) ("For a brief time Vanderbilt became, in the
national press, one of the most widely reviled universities in the country."); Theo Emery,
Activist Ousted from Vanderbilt is Back, as a Teacher, NY TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at A16
(discussing how James Lawson, expelled from Vanderbilt Divinity School in 1960 for
organizing sit-ins against segregation in Nashville, returned in fall 2006 to teach at
Vanderbilt).
23. Clearly, the consequences of Pre-Start for Emory as an institution are partly a
function of its consequences for the students who gained admission through the
program. We are still in the process of tracking down those students. Logistically as
well as intellectually, it is important to report the outcomes for students in a separate
article. It might seem that this decision undercuts the ability of the present article to
respond to Sander's thesis, but I believe part of the problem with Sander's article is that
it frames the debate much too narrowly. Therefore, while A Systemic Analysis is the
800-pound gorilla in this debate, demanding some form of direct address, I actually
hope to avoid having the present article become entirely, or even primarily, a response
to Sander. Instead, I hope to engage more directly with Justice Thomas' dissent in
Grutter.
24. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1;
Crystal D. Meredith, custodial parent and next friend of Joshua Ryan McDonald v.
Jefferson County Board of Education et al., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) [hereinafter, Parents
Involved]. These cases, which the Court decided in the June 2007 term, deal entirely with
public elementary and secondary schools, but the Court's analysis relies heavily on the
logic of Grutter in evaluating what constitutes a compelling state interest that can justify
using racial classifications. See id. Thus, the Court has now held squarely that
discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause is also discrimination for
purposes of Title IV, id. at 2748, and has applied the strict-scrutiny analysis of a higher
education case to elementary and secondary schools. Id. at 2751. The Court asserts in
Parents Involved that "the present cases [involving elementary and secondary schools]
are not governed by Grutter," id. at 2753, but the point is that the exception for racial
classifications in university admissions that Grutter allows does not apply to elementary
and secondary schools, where the considerations of university administration do not
apply. Thus, the Court's analysis of elementary and secondary schools' use of racial
classifications is even stricter than that of universities. The key unresolved question for
private universities is whether a private right of action exists under Title VI that would
allow individuals to sue them for their affirmative action programs.
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of Pre-Start and what it tells us about the varying motives and
experiences of institutions and the persons who administer those
institutions. In creating Pre-Start, Johnson had in mind the large
issue of increasing the number of African-American attorneys in the
South. 25 But Johnson appreciated the point that, in order to achieve
that goal, historically segregated institutions such as Emory would
have to make an extra effort in order to overcome a long history of
distrust for them on the part of African Americans. Other methods
exist for doing so, but affirmative action programs have the triple
effect of, first, increasing the number of African-American students
in the institution by, second, asserting a belief that they have greater
academic capacity than conventional indicators suggest, thereby,
third, signaling to potential applicants the institution's interest in
addressing the continuing effects of racial discrimination in our
society. 26
The argument of this article is that the critics of affirmative
action are right: Affirmative action does tend to increase racial
hostility, at least in those who see themselves as entitled to the
places in law school and other classrooms that African Americans
get by dint of affirmative action. 27 But ending affirmative action
25. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
26. See infra sec. IV.
27. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 ("Petitioner alleged that respondents
discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat 252, 42 USC § 2000d; and Rev Stat § 1977,
as amended, 42 USC § 1981. Petitioner further alleged that her application was rejected
because the Law School uses race as a 'predominant' factor, giving applicants who
belong to certain minority groups 'a significantly greater chance of admission than
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.' Petitioner also alleged
that respondents 'had no compelling interest to justify their use of race in the admissions
process."') (some internal citations omitted); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 257 (2003)
("Petitioners asserted that the LSA's use of race as a factor in admissions violates Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 USC § 2000d, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Smith v. Univ. of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188,
1191 (2000) ("Smith claimed that the denials of admission had been due to racially
discriminatory admissions policies, which violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d");
Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied,
April 4, 1996; reh'g en banc denied, April 4, 1996, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 9919; cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996) ("The plaintiffs sued primarily under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; they also claimed derivative statutory violations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
('title VI'). The plaintiffs' central claim is that they were subjected to unconstitutional
racial discrimination by the law school's evaluation of their admissions applications.
They sought injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive
damages"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278-79 ("[Petitioner] alleged that the Medical School's
special admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his
race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Art. I, § 21, of the California Constitution, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil
[Vol. 5
also increases racial hostility insofar as African Americans - and
presumably others - see attacks on affirmative action as attacks on
the principle of racial equality. 28 Institutions thus face a choice:
cater to the white people who consider affirmative action to be
"reverse discrimination," or cater to African Americans who see
affirmative action as a necessary means of remedying the effects of
past discrimination. Of course, institutions have to make their
choices in this area within the context of law. This article suggests
that the application of the law to affirmative action programs might
reasonably vary according to geography and other salient facts
about the institution.
That is, historical evidence can put statistical generalizations
into a very different light.29  The South was unrepresentative
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.").
28. See, e.g., Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the
Constitutional Rhetoric of Mhite Innocence, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 477, 482-83 (2006) ("This
Article focuses on affirmative action in higher education as but one, albeit a particularly
illustrative one, of a myriad of examples of the continued strategic consistency and
evolving tactical transformation of White supremacy. The principle thesis of this Article
is that, at its core, the intense polarization of the debate over affirmative action is less
about the surrogate discourses of diversity, candor, and fairness and fundamentally
more about the racialized perspectival chasm regarding the standpoint from which
racial reality is interpreted, articulated, legitimized, conceived and imagined in juridical,
political, and public discourse"); Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Open Water:
Affirmative Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming Predators - A Response to Richard Sander,
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 795 (2006). See also Charlotte Steeh & Maria Krysan, Trends: Affirmative
Action and the Public, 1970-1995, 60 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 128 (1996) (convergence, but
remaining significant disparity, between blacks and whites in opinions about affirmative
action and related issues). But see Carol M. Swain, Robert R. Rodgers, & Bernard W.
Silverman, Life After Bakke Mhere Mhites and Blacks Agree: Public Support for Fairness in
Educational Opportunities, 16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 147 (2000) (reviewing public
opinion polling data indicating large areas of overlap between black and white
respondents). Both sets of authors stress the point that public opinion in this area is
particularly hard to gauge because the wording of the questions has an unusually large
impact, with much of the public not necessarily associating specific practices with the
phrase "affirmative action" as experts would. Steeh & Krysan, supra, at 128; Swain, et
al., supra, at 161. See also Faye J. Crosby & Cheryl VanDeVeer, Introduction, in SEX, RACE,
AND MERIT: DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 1-5 (Faye
J. Crosby and Cheryl VanDeVeer, eds., 2000) (discussing meaning of "affirmative
action"). Swain, et al., proved wrong with their prediction that "the Supreme Court,
with its current membership, is quite likely to reject the diversity rationale when it has
occasion to revisit the issue of racial preferences in higher education," Swain, et al.,
supra, at 148, compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325, "today we endorse Justice Powell's view
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race
in university admissions," but the rest of their analysis is compelling. Indeed, among
the many reasons to examine the history of affirmative action at Emory is that doing so
may help reconcile the law with public opinion in a manner that Swain, et al., argue is
desirable and inevitable.
29. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 12, at 1919 (responding to Sander by claiming
benefits of affirmative action over time to African Americans).
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relative to the United States as a whole in 196230 and in 1978, 31 and it
remains so today.32 But the very facts that make it unrepresentative
also make it the logical focal point for exploring affirmative action
policy: nearly all of the states that had de jure segregation during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had also had
slavery, 33 and nearly all of them are part of the South to some
degree.34 More importantly, the majority of the nation's African
30. Emory, 127 S.E.2d 798.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
32. See, e.g., Paul K. Conkin, Hot, Humid, and Sad, 64 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 3 (1998)
(presidential address to the Southern Historical Association discussing ways in which
history continues to shape southern experience). But see Patricia Cohen, Interpreting
Some Overlooked Stories from the South, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2007, at El (describing recent
trend in southern history of exploring the region's connections to the rest of the nation,
rather than its exceptionalism). Emory historian Joseph Crespino is nearly finished
editing a book under the title THE END OF SOUTHERN HISTORY (forthcoming), in which
the authors explore the possibility that the South will not much longer remain distinct
within the United States. See also J. WILLIAM HARRIS, DEEP SOUTHS: DELTA, PIEDMONT,
AND SEA ISLAND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF SEGREGATION (Johns Hopkins University 2001)
(demonstrating that "the South" is far from monolithic, even in terms of segregation).
33. See Conkin, supra note 32, for a useful map that defines "the South" in climatic
terms such that it encompasses all of the states that joined the Confederacy (Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Caroline,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) plus most of Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware as well as
the southern half of Missouri (the four slave states that failed to secede), the
southernmost tips of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio (all immediately north of the Ohio
River), and the eastern half of Oklahoma and southeastern corner of Kansas. See also
WILLIAM L. BARNEY, BATTLEGROUND FOR THE UNION: THE ERA OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1848-1877 (Prentiss Hall 1990) (useful overview of the period that
covers the run-up to secession and its aftermath).
34. See Conkin, supra note 32. Interestingly, several of the landmark school
desegregation cases involve states that were not part of the Confederacy: Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). See Robert W. Frizzell, Southern Identity in Nineteenth-
Century Missouri: Little Dixie's Slave-Majority Areas and the Transition to Midwestern
Farming, 99 MISSOURI HIST. REV. 238 (2005). Oklahoma did not exist as a state at the time
of secession. See David M. Ryan, The All-American Battle, 42 CIVIL WAR TIMES 44 (2004)
(describing Battle of Honey Springs, July 17, 1863, at which Union prevented
Confederacy from gaining complete control of Indian Territory). Cherokees living in
Indian Territory did own slaves, before removal and afterward, and fought for the
Confederacy. See TIYA MILES, TIES THAT BIND: THE STORY OF AN AFRO-CHEROKEE
FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (University of California Press 2005). Perhaps most
ironically, Kansas was a major focal point for anti-slavery activity during the years
immediately preceding secession. In the 1840s and 1850s, however, "antislavery" was
not the same as "abolition," and free soilers in Kansas did not necessarily support rights
for African Americans simply because they opposed the expansion of slavery into their
state. See NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS: CONTESTED LIBERTY IN THE CIVIL WAR
ERA (University of Kansas Press 2004). See also, Edward H. Sebesta & Euan Hague, The
U.S. Civil War as a Theological War: Confederate Christian Nationalism and the League of the
South, 32 CANADIAN REV. AM. STUDIES (2002) (explaining that the League of the South,
[Vol. 5
Americans continue to live in the South. 35 Whatever decisions we as
a nation make about race-based affirmative action, they will have a
disproportionate impact in the South.
B. "Emory... is in the South."36
The history of integration at Emory in general, and Pre-Start in
particular, is hugely important because Emory exemplifies the sort
of southern institution, and therefore the sort of persons in the
South, who wish to redeem the region's history by frankly
acknowledging the continuing impact of slavery and segregation
and thinking carefully and creatively about how to minimize that
impact.37  Pre-Start provides a starting point from which
formed in 1994, advocates formation of new Confederacy through secession of original
eleven states, plus Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland).
35. See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals
by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions,
Divisions, and States (U.S. Census Bureau Population Division Working Paper No. 56,
Sept. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twpsOO56/twpsO56.
pdf. In 1990, the total black population of the U.S. was 29,986,060, 12 percent of a total of
248,709,873. Id. at tbl.1. In the Northeast, the black population was 5,613,222, 11 percent
of a total of 50,809,229. Id. at tbl.2. In the Midwest, the black population was 5,715,940,
9.5 percent of a total of 59,668,632. Id. at tbl.3. In the West, the black population was
2,828,010, 5 percent of a total of 52,786,082. Id. at tbl.4. In the South, the black
population was 15,828,888, 18.5 percent of a total 85,445,930. Id. at tbl.5. See also, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2005 5 (showing a map of the racial
composition of United States by state in 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/dynamic/RACEHO.pdf. All of the
states with more than twenty percent African-American population, Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
are former Confederate states except Delaware and Maryland (again, slave states that
failed to secede). Id. States with between ten percent and twenty percent African-
American population are Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
Virginia's percentage African-American population is 19.9. Id. As of July 1, 2004,
African Americans made up 12.8 percent of the nation's total population. Id.
36. Statement by Emory President S. Walter Martin to "Selected Faculty Members,"
March 31, 1960, box 1, Desegregation Documentation, Emory University Archives
[hereinafter "EUA"], Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University [hereinafter
Desegregation Documentation]. In 1966, Emory administrator Norman C. Smith, with
the assistance of Henry Bowden, President of the Board of Trustees and University
Counsel, compiled documents relating to racial integration at Emory from a wide range
of sources. In 1976, he deposited his compilation in the University Archives. Memo,
Norman C. Smith to Don L. Bosseau, Director of Emory Libraries, Jan. 12, 1976, box 1,
Desegregation Documentation. This excellent compilation provides a useful starting
point for research on the topic.
37. See, e.g., Emory University Transforming Community Project, which "seeks to
mobilize individuals in every sector of Emory University to engage in a reflective, fact-
driven creation of this institution's history as it relates to race. The construction of this
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southerners - black and white - can make a unique, significant
contribution to the debate. In policy terms, the choice is perhaps
less stark, but in rhetorical terms, it is even sharper now than it was
in the early 1960s: Do you want to participate in a full and fair
debate of the issues, or do you wish to continue engaging in a form
of denial that impedes resolution of those issues?
Emory is a good place to look as well in terms of regional
leadership. The debate over affirmative action tends to focus on
nationally prominent institutions, and reasonably so, if only because
of Sander's claim about the cascading effect of affirmative action,38
which Emory faculty identified as a problem at the time of Pre-Start
as well. 39 In addition to being one of the South's leading research
universities, Emory is the leading private research university in
Georgia. Anyone who understands the South realizes that, in
important ways, the appropriate reference point for Emory is not
Harvard, 40 but the University of Georgia. 41 Integration of both
institutions depended on changes in state law, but private
institutions necessarily stand in different relationship to the state
history will be rooted in Emory's involvement in African-American enslavement,
segregation, integration, and the world that blacks and whites created together in the
South." Emory University Transforming Community Project, About This Project,
http://transform.emory.edu/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). See also, DAN P. McADAMS,
THE REDEMPTIVE SELF: STORIES AMERICANS LIVE BY (Oxford University Press 2006)
(profiling as distinctively American individual life stories of "highly generative"
individuals who see opportunities for good coming from their suffering, identifying the
nation's history of racism as a particularly fructive source for such opportunities).
38. Sander, supra note 12, at 416-17 ("Affirmative action thus has a cascading effect
through American legal education. The use of large boosts for black applicants at the
top law schools means that the highest-scoring blacks are almost entirely absorbed by
the highest tier. Schools in the next tier have no choice but to either enroll very few
blacks or use racial boosts or segregated admissions tracks to the same degree as the
top-tier schools. The same pattern continues all the way down the hierarchy.").
39. Nathaniel E. Gozansky & Michael D. DeVito, An Enlightened Comparison: The
Relevant Strengths and Weaknesses of the CLEO Program and the Pre-Start Program of Emory
University, 2 UNIv. TOL. L. REV. 719, 720 (1970).
40. Harvard was the express reference point for Emory trustees and administrators
who decided in Jan. 1961 to supplement the University's existing library with a new
research library. See Emory Trustees Development Committee Report, First in the
South - The Library for Advanced Studies, Emory Board of Trustees Executive Committee
Minutes (Jan. 12, 1961) (on file at Emory University Archives). As the title of the
document indicates, Emory trustees saw their institution as southern, and as providing
leadership for the South. Id.
41. For 2007, U.S. News & World Report ranked Emory 22nd (tied with George
Washington University) and University of Georgia 36th (in an eight-way tie with
Indiana at Bloomington, Alabama, Hastings, Colorado at Boulder, Maryland, UNC at
Chapel Hill, and Wake Forest). U.S. News & World Report, Best Graduate Schools,
http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/
law /brief/lawrank_ brief.php (follow "Law" hyperlink) (last visited June 29, 2007). But
see supra note 21.
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than public institutions do.42 Emory's initiative in integrating also
means that it may still stand in a different relationship to southern
identity than its public counterparts. 43
That is, whether Emory is a truly southern institution or not, it
is very much an Atlanta institution. To some extent, Atlanta has
always been different, a northern city in the South.44 It was a center
of transportation and commerce from its founding, with few
planters and few slaves. It attracted residents, including political
leaders, from outside the South before the Civil War, and it attracted
manufacturing activity and African-American residents after the
War.45 Insofar as a characteristic of white southern identity at least
through the second reconstruction of the 1960s was a willingness to
perpetuate segregation in defiance of national and international
condemnation, 46 Emory administrators were either not southerners,
or a different breed of southerners. 47 Or they saw themselves as
42. Compare Emory, 127 S.E.2d 798 (striking down state statute that would have
rescinded private institutions' tax exemption if they integrated racially) with Holmes v.
Danner, Registrar of the University of Georgia, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga., 1961) (order
prohibiting state officials from cutting off University of Georgia's state appropriations if
it admitted African-American students).
43. Emory administrator Thomas E. Jenkins tells the story of a particularly bright
native Georgian who chose to attend the University of Georgia rather than Emory.
When asked why she did so, she replied, "Emory is like a northeastern school. If I
wanted to go to a northeastern school, I would go to the northeast." Interview with
Thomas E. Jenkins, Emory Administrator, in Atlanta, Ga. (June 20, 2007).
44. James Aaron Frith, The Manger of the Movement: Atlanta and the Black
Freedom Struggle, 1890-1950 5 (1997) ( Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University); ALLISON
DORSEY, To BUILD OUR LIVES TOGETHER: COMMUNITY FORMATION IN BLACK ATLANTA,
1875-1906 1 (University of Georgia Press 2004) ("Atlanta was manifestly a city of the
New, rather than the Old, South."). On the distinction between the New and Old
Souths, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE NEW SOUTH, 1945-1980 (Louisiana State University
Press 1995); DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, THE SOUTH IN MODERN AMERICA: A REGION AT
ODDS (University of Arkansas Press 1995); HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, THE FIRST NEW
SOUTH, 1865-1920 (Harlan Davidson 1992); EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW
SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION (Oxford University Press 1992); DEVELOPING DIXIE:
MODERNIZATION IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (Winfred B. Moore, Jr., Joseph F. Tripp, and
Lyon G. Tyler, eds. 1988); GAINES M. FOSTER, GHOSTS OF THE CONFEDERACY: DEFEAT,
THE LOST CAUSE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1865 TO 1913 (Oxford
University Press 1987); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH (Louisiana
State University Press 1951).
45. Frith, supra note 44, at 6-7.
46. See, e.g., Thomas Victor O'Brien, Georgia's response to Brown v. Board of Education:
The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance, 1949-1961 (1992) ( Ph.D. dissertation, Emory
University).
47. The settlement ending racial segregation in downtown Atlanta in 1961 elicited
from Mayor Hartsfield the famous assertion that his was a city that was "too busy to
hate." See Jack L. Walker, Sit-Ins in Atlanta: A Study in the Negro Revolt, in ATLANTA,
GEORGIA, 1960-1961: SIT-INS AND STUDENT ACTIVISM 87 (David Garrow, ed., 1989).
Hartsfield demonstrated his senses of civic pride, and of humor, during this crisis by
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having the opportunity and the responsibility to change aspects of
the South that needed changing.
Ben Johnson and other Emory administrators recognized
during the early 1960s that segregation was the single largest
impediment - perhaps the only impediment 48 - to their goal of
making Emory a nationally recognized research university on par
with Harvard, the University of Chicago, Stanford, etc. Critics of
affirmative action often posit a tension between policies that serve to
increase African-American enrollment and the goal of maintaining
the highest possible intellectual standards. 49  Johnson saw the
matter differently. He saw the university's intellectual authority as
a function, at least in part, of its moral authority. More concretely,
by the 1960s, national funding agencies and learned societies had
become vocal in their condemnation of segregation and promised
not to cooperate with institutions that practiced it.50 Insofar as the
stating, "Well, at least in the field of lunch counter demonstrations, Atlanta can claim
two firsts. With the help of the Ku Klux Klan, it can be the first to claim integrated
picketing. And now we have radio-directed picketing. At least we are handling our
problems in a progressive way." Id. at 82.
48. Although Emory now has a reputation as a rich institution, primarily by dint of
major contributions from the Robert W. Woodruff Foundation, that largesse began in
1979, after racial integration and Pre-Start. During the 1960s, Emory was not
particularly prosperous among American research universities. See, e.g., Development
Committee, Report to the Board of Trustees, Nov. 2-3, 1961, explaining "urgency" of need
for income to pay for capital expenditures, which must nevertheless wait for resolution
of integration issue. In folder, "Annual Meeting - Board of Trustees, 1961," box 7, Henry
Bowden files, EUA. See also, Nancy Diamond, Catching Up: The Advance of Emory
University since World War II, 19 HIsT. HIGHER ED. ANN. 149, 152 (1999). Of course, it
seems reasonable to wonder if the leadership of Emory administrators in racial
integration helped the institution to attract major donations.
49. Sander does not make this claim, but a necessary inference from the claims he
does make is that African Americans who secure admission to much better law schools
than they otherwise would drag down the academic quality of the institutions that they
attend. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 12, at 432 (discussing his evidence for dramatic
differences in performance between white and African-American students). See also
John Nussbaumer, The Disturbing Correlation between ABA Accreditation Review and
Declining African American Law School Enrollment, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 991 (2006)
(describing evidence that ABA accreditation review leads law schools to increase their
mean LSAT scores and decrease their African-American enrollments); Dave Berkman,
Racial Equality: Campus Abstraction Meets Classroom Reality, 52 LIBERAL EDUC. 422 (1966)
(presenting an agonized discussion of how one professor has responded to problem of
ill-prepared African-American students in his own classes). During his service as an
administrator at Emory, after he graduated from law school, Marvin Arrington
addressed this point, asserting that the source of African Americans' substandard
academic performance was not lack of ability, but racism. Letter from Marvin S.
Arrington, to Faculty of Emory Law School (Feb. 4, 1970), in folder, "Black Students,"
box 11, Judson Ward files [hereinafter Ward files], EUA.
50. See Kean, supra note 22, at 1 ("The desegregation of the private universities of the
South was in fact accomplished by coercion - by northern foundations, professional
[Vol. 5
American university system has succeeded by fostering dialogue
among faculty around the nation, no university could excel without
participating in national networks.
Johnson never articulated the point this way, but his actions as
dean of Emory Law School carry the implication that the collective
denial by privileged white men that was racial segregation
necessarily undermined, not only their moral status, but their ability
to engage fully in their stated intellectual enterprise. Just as Thomas
Jefferson notoriously lost his otherwise impressive empirical
faculties when the subject came to race, so professors at segregated
institutions missed out on important aspects of the world they lived
in by dint of their institutions' refusal to admit African Americans.
C. Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est la Meme Chose
I am a structuralist. 51 I see overwhelming evidence in the
world for the proposition that the patterns of thought and language
that all humans grow up with profoundly and necessarily shape,
not only how we interpret the world, but how we perceive it.52
academic associations, accrediting bodies, faculties that began to vote with their feet,
divinity students and professors who felt called to oppose racial oppression, alumni
who withheld contributions, and, the final straw, by new federal rules for grant
recipients. And ultimately, behind all these pressures was the power of the grass-roots
civil rights movement, led by southern blacks themselves, which created a national crisis
of conscience and brought places like these schools under the close scrutiny of the entire
nation.").
51. I am actually a poststructuralist in that I believe the structures of human culture
change over time. They change very slowly, and no individual or small group can
exercise much control over the direction, pace, or content of the change, but it does
occur. For fuller elaboration of this point, see WILLIAM B. TURNER, A GENEALOGY OF
QUEER THEORY 19-24 (Temple University Press 2000). Of the many reasons I have to be
grateful to Martha Fineman, not least is her description of herself as a structuralist
during our many conversations about my research on the history of integration and
affirmative action at Emory, giving me license to describe myself thus in my legal
scholarship. See also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995). Krieger does not couch her argument in terms of structuralism, but the point is
the same: Cognitive, that is, perceptual, factors can explain most of contemporary
discrimination better than motivational factors. Id.
52. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law
Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 208, 217 (1989)
("The systems function rather like molecular biology's double helix: They replicate
preexisting ideas, thoughts, and approaches."). Note that this article uses as its epigraph
the famous opening passage from MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SERIES xv (Routledge 1973), in which Foucault relates a
Chinese taxonomy of animals and comments on "the stark impossibility of thinking
that." Id. at 203. The point of this passage is not that we cannot translate it-Foucault
probably read it in French, and the passage makes its point well enough in English as
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Michel Foucault argued that what was most striking about
European intellectual history from the beginning of the scientific
revolution through the nineteenth century was not so much the
development consistently over that time of individual fields of
inquiry as the striking consistency within periods from one field to
another. A particular mode of defining and analyzing objects, on
this view, prevailed through the nineteenth century, making
evolutionary biology, linguistics, and economics more conceptually
congruent with one another than any was with its apparent
predecessors of the period before 1800. 53 An implicit point in
Foucault's work is that, within a given historical period, the same
questions will recur repeatedly, never achieving resolution, but
eventually becoming irrelevant as the circumstances change. 54
This article demonstrates that integration at Emory and Pre-
Start have much to tell us about the recurring debate over
affirmative action, particularly in law schools, but in American
higher education generally. But what documents from the 1950s
and 1960s in the archives at Emory and other southern universities,
well. The point is that Foucault could never have produced the taxonomy as an
autochthonous thought. See also, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert Reidlinger, eds., Wade Baskin, trans., 1959);
FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF
STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM (Princeton University Press 1972); CLAUDE
LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson & Brooke Grunfest
Schoepf, trans. 1963); Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences, in
THE LANGUAGES OF CRITICISM AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN: THE STRUCTURALIST
CONTROVERSY (Richard Macksey & Eugenio Donato, eds., 1970); MICHEL FOUCAULT:
BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, eds.,
1982); TILOTrAMA RAJAN, DECONSTRUCTION AND THE REMAINDERS OF
PHENOMENOLOGY: SARTRE, DERRIDA, FOUCAULT, BAUDRILLARD (Stanford University
Press 2002).
53. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, supra note 52. Foucault emphatically rejected
the term "structuralist" as a description of his work, id. at xi, but his assertion only
makes sense as differentiating him from structuralist literary critics of the period. See
TURNER, supra note 51.
54. See, e.g., THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 16, at vii:
Social scientists have been trying to understand the black-white test score
gap since World War I, when test scores collected from the U.S. Army's
wartime recruits first demonstrated its existence. But empirical research
on the subject has proceeded in fits and starts. By now this cycle has
become predictable. First someone claims that the black-white gap is
largely innate. Then skeptics challenge this claim. The debate starts off
largely unencumbered by evidence, but it eventually precipitates a number
of useful empirical studies. The issue is not fully resolved, but the number
of plausible explanations is smaller at the end of the debate than at the
beginning. This happened in the 1920s. It happened again in the 1970s,
after Arthur Jensen published 'How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic
Achievement?" in the Harvard Education Review in 1969. It seems to be
happening again now, at least partly as a result of The Bell Curve.
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considered in light of the current affirmative action debate,
demonstrate above all else is the depressing sameness of the debate
then and now.55 The terms and the specific policies have changed,
but the structure of certain arguments has not.5 6 The hope to find
some justification for eliminating affirmative action sounds
distressingly like the hope to find some justification for continuing
segregation.
My claim is not that all opponents of affirmative action are
closet segregationists. Part of the point of structuralism is that the
enduring patterns of thought and meaning in a culture can resist
impressively the efforts of individuals to change them. Changing
the patterns of culture is like overcoming addiction: it is impossible
unless one first recognizes that the problem exists. My claim is that
we have advanced little from the end of slavery in terms of debating
whether Americans as a whole bear significant responsibility for
eradicating the effects of slavery and segregation. If we do, then
affirmative action is reasonable, even tepid. If we do not, then
affirmative action is racial discrimination that is no better than the
old kind for preferring blacks over whites, instead of vice versa.
All of the challenges to affirmative action policies in federal
courts to date have involved public universities. 57  With the
exception of Hopwood, they have involved universities outside of the
South. It is tempting to consider what would happen if universities
55. Infra notes 302-307 and accompanying text.
56. Hunt, supra note 28, at 480 ("A matter of considerable scholarly and political
debate is whether the dramatic change in the power of racism represents a real defeat or
merely, in response to changing circumstances, a tactical withdrawal from the overt
center stage and a redeployment in new disguises, metaphors, and surrogate discourses
with the same tired unreconstructed strategic goals of total racial domination, racialized
exclusion, and uncontested normative White supremacy.").
57. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281-84 (discussing whether a private right of action exists
under Title VI, concluding solely for purpose of the instant case that it does); Smith, 233
F.3d at 1201 (upholding decertification of class for mootness, holding that diversity is
compelling state interest justifying use of race in law school admission program);
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934 (holding Univ. of Texas law school's affirmative action program
violated Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (dismissing a challenge to Univ. of Wash. Law school admission
policy as moot). See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 283-84
(1986) (striking down scheme for laying off public school teachers in Michigan district
that gave preference by race). But see Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511
(1988) (striking down race-based set-aside for municipal contractors in capital of the
Confederacy). "That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide
discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions
are free to decide that such remedies [as racial set-asides] are appropriate.... It would
seem equally clear, however, that a state or local subdivision... has the authority to
eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction." Id.
at 490-91.
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such as Emory, Vanderbilt, Duke, Tulane,5 8 and others in the South
demonstrated their keen interest in increasing the number of
African-American attorneys in the South. Emory faculty and
administrators concentrated their recruitment for Pre-Start in the
South on the logic that the region had the largest need for African-
American attorneys. They also concentrated their recruitment at
historically black colleges and universities ("HBCUs").59 One could
as easily do so today. The institutions still exist. 60  Systematic
recruitment at them might even be good for the HBCUs themselves,
as their ability to place their graduates in law (and other
professional?) schools could attract more and better applicants to
them.
The Supreme Court's analysis of affirmative action as a remedy
for past discrimination has always proceeded at the level of
individual institutions, not an entire region. 61 Further, in the area of
civil rights, regional variation was always the problem, not the
solution. The Fourteenth Amendment defines citizenship in
national terms in order to minimize state variation in the rights that
citizens enjoy. 62 African Americans resorted to the federal courts in
challenging segregation because state courts would usually not defy
state legislatures by striking segregation statutes down 63 (Emory v.
58. See Kean, supra note 22. I omit Rice from this list because my focus is on law
schools, which Rice does not have. I rely on Kean's list because it gives some principle
of selection for this brief list, which omits a number of fine law schools in the South.
59. See infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
60. One of Clarence Thomas's reasons for opposing affirmative action, or even
vigorous methods to achieve integration, is his concern that encouraging large numbers
of African-American students to attend predominantly white institutions will cause the
collapse of historically black colleges and universities, which white students show no
sign of applying to in large numbers. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364-65 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court never acknowledges... the growing evidence that racial (and
other sorts) of heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students"); KEVIN
MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 153, 257-59 (Doubleday 2007).
61. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
62. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside."). See also, Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 ("The Civil War
Amendments themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between
congressional and state power over matters of race."). Speaking of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments in Ex parte Virginia, the Court stated: 'They were intended to
be, what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of the
power of Congress."' 10 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
63. Federal judges were usually better, but not always. See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 305
F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962) (noting that the trial judge "held, 'there is no custom or policy
now, nor was there any at the time of the plaintiff's application, which excluded
Negroes from entering the University.' This about-face in policy, news of which may
startle some people in Mississippi, could have been accomplished only by telepathic
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Nash is the exception that proves the rule 64). Regional variation in
the law of affirmative action could be, for opponents of affirmative
action, the same as the belief that one can distinguish malicious
from benign racial classifications 65 - definitionally impermissible.
It could be that such institutions already engage in such
practices on the belief that suits against private universities are
highly unlikely. 66 Just as Emory could integrate peacefully while
violence broke out at public universities in the deep South, so
perhaps Emory and its cousins can proceed quietly with affirmative
action while litigation swirls about them. Besides its inherent
historical interest, Pre-Start is fascinating because it allows us to see
what one law school did when no threat of litigation existed at all. It
also allows us to consider what a program might have to look like in
order to win five votes on a shifting Supreme Court. Decisions
involving racial classifications - not just in education, but in other
areas as well - have a striking propensity to produce highly
fractured opinions from the Court.67 It seems clear that, in this
communication among the University's administrators ....").
64. Emory, 127 S.E.2d 798 (striking down segregation provision of state tax code by
Georgia Supreme Court).
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 371 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239).
66. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("One can reasonably
anticipate... that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority
enrollment-and the networks and opportunities thereby opened to minority
graduates -whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of affirmative
action plans of the kind here at issue.") See also, id. at 275 n.22 (Rehnquist responding
that Ginsburg would have the Court adapt the Constitution to the practices of
universities, rather than vice versa).
67. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 301 (1990)
("From its beginning in Bakke through the most recently decided cases, the Court has
splintered again and again, and the Justices have authored opinions that constitute a
bitter and divisive dialogue."). See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Chief Justice Roberts
gathering the votes of four justices, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy, for the holding
and most of his opinion, but losing Kennedy's vote for parts III-B and IV of his opinion).
Arguably, Grutter and Gratz follow this pattern, with Justice O'Connor playing the role
of Justice Powell, whose opinion in Bakke split the difference between two groups of his
colleagues, each consisting of four Justices. The key difference is just the historical
circumstance that the Court reviewed two distinct fact patterns in which O'Connor
discerned a legally significant difference, such that she could vote with two majorities.
See also, e.g., League of United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") v. Perry, 126 S. Ct.
2594, 2603 (2006) (reviewing racial gerrymandering in Texas congressional districts)
("Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts II-A and III, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts I and IV, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, J.,
joined, an opinion with respect to Parts I-B and II-C, and an opinion with respect to Part
II-D, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ. ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, in which Breyer, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Souter, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
Summer 2008]
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
respect, the Court accurately reflects the divisions in the larger
society. Is it only "meddling," to borrow Justice Thomas's term, 68
for university administrators to seek solutions to this problem, albeit
by trial and error, with their admissions policies? Richard Sander's
analysis attracted substantial attention, 69 not only because his
central claim was highly provocative, but also because participants
and observers have a genuine need to know the effects of their
choices. Pre-Start is a unique historical example that, as the next
section shows, has had no impact on existing law, but should
influence future decisions.
II. The Law of Affirmative Action
Bad facts, the old saying goes, make bad law. The facts of
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 7° may not have been
bad,71 but they did not reflect very well the history of discrimination
that gave rise, first to laws prohibiting such discrimination, and
Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Roberts, C. J., filed
an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part, in which Alito, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined, and in which Roberts, C. J., and
Alito, J., joined as to Part III"); Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) ("O'CONNOR, J.,
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, III-B, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and
KENNEDY, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which REHNQUIST, C. J.,
and WHITE, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and V, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., post, p. 511,
and KENNEDY, J., post, p. 518, filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 520.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 528. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 561.").
68. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Ideas & Trends; For Blacks in Law School, Can Less be More?,
NY TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/13/weekinreview
/ 131iptak.html?_r=1&scp=l&sq= %22Ideas+ %26+Trends%3B+For+Blacks+in+Law+Scho
ol%2C+Can+Less+be+More%3F%22&st=nyt&oref=slogin. See also Jonathan D. Glater,
Ideas & Trends; Straight "A" Student? Good Luck Making Partner, NY TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006,
at D3; Adam Liptak, Lawyers Debate Why Blacks Lag at Major Firms, NY TIMES, Nov. 29,
2006, at Al. See also, Cummings, supra note 28, at 799 ("Sander's study and article has
[sic] created a conflagration of attention and rebuke.").
70. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
71. See DREYFUS & LAWRENCE, supra note 17, at 32 ("These unspectacular events have
brought into question the university's commitment to the defense of the case and cast
doubt on the competence of the attorneys involved. The facts indicate that the
university lawyers were hampered not so much by a lack of lawyering skills as by the
competing concerns of their client and an ambivalence about the issues central to the
case.").
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second to affirmative action policies. Besides being in the West, the
region with the smallest percentage African-American population in
the United States, the medical school at the University of California
at Davis, whose admission policies precipitated the law suit, had
only existed since 1968.72 It cannot ever have practiced official racial
segregation because it came into existence only after federal statutes
prohibited such actions. Regardless, Bakke presented the first major
challenge to an affirmative action program to reach the United
States Supreme Court. Perhaps surprisingly, twenty-five years
elapsed before the Court again addressed affirmative action in
higher education. The Court came to opposite determinations
regarding the respective affirmative action programs in Grutter v.
Bollinger73 and Gratz v. Bollinger.74 The legal holdings in both cases,
however, reaffirmed the core holding of Bakke, particularly the rule
that diversity in the student body is a compelling state interest that
can justify race-based affirmative action under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 75
The Gratz Court also expressly reiterated that "discrimination
that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment committed by an institution that accepts federal funds
also constitutes a violation of Title VI."76 That is, although Bakke,
Gratz, and Grutter all involve public institutions, the holdings of the
three cases apply to any private university of any stature because
such institutions certainly receive sufficient federal funds to ensure
that disregarding Title VI would be prohibitive. 77
The problem with all of these cases for deciding affirmative
action law and policy is that their facts have little to do with the
reality of racial discrimination in most of the United States. Emory's
experience with Pre-Start is a much better test. Courts cannot
choose their litigants. Barring directly conflicting decisions in the
circuits, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will take another
case involving affirmative action in higher education any time soon.
But those opinions have scarcely settled the debate. One of the chief
72. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273.
73. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
74. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
75. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
76. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 n.23.
77. See, e.g., EMORY UNIVERSITY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, AUG. 31, 2006 & 2005 3 (government grants and
contracts providing $224,319,000 out of $2,609,156,000 in total operating revenue),
available at https://www.finance.emory.edu/externalfinancials/2006/emoryfimancials.pdf. See
also DESEGREGATING AMERICA'S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: TITLE VI REGULATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION (John B. Williams, III, ed. 1988). But see STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON
THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
(Johns Hopkins University Press 1995).
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purposes of this article, therefore, is to use Emory's experience with
Pre-Start as the basis for stepping back from the Supreme Court
decisions and rethinking the premises of the debate. This section
describes the legal issues that have arisen repeatedly in the Supreme
Court's decisions in this area, which are: the application of strict
scrutiny as the correct level of analysis; what constitutes a
compelling state interest; whether a given use of race is sufficiently
narrowly tailored; and when the program in question will end.
A. Strict Scrutiny and Compelling State Interest
The plaintiff in Bakke applied to the medical school at the
University of California at Davis, but did not win admission.78 He
filed suit, claiming that the school's practice of reserving a set
number of spaces in its entering class for racial and ethnic minorities
violated "his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Art. I, § 21, of the California Constitution,
and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . ."79 The
medical school at UC Davis had only existed for a few years at that
time, having been created in 1968,80 after the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. The opinion asserted that, absent a past practice of
discrimination, remediation of discrimination was not a plausible
justification for that institution to offer in support of its affirmative
action policy. 81
In what is becoming a pattern for Supreme Court decisions
involving racial classifications, 82 no opinion of the Court attracted a
majority of Justices' votes. Even so, despite coming in a mere
plurality opinion, Justice's Powell's reasoning became highly
influential. As O'Connor put it in her Grutter opinion, "Justice
Powell's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served
as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious
admissions policies. Public and private universities across the
Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice
78. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77.
79. Id. at 278.
80. Id. at 273.
81. Id. at 301-02 (distinguishing cases where courts allowed race-conscious remedies
as following judicial determination of de jure discrimination, which did not exist in
instant case). "[W]e have never approved preferential classifications in the absence of
proved constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 302. See also, Parents Involved, 127 S.
Ct. at 2768 (Seattle schools never legally segregated, Jefferson County schools formerly
segregated, but declared "unitary" by federal judge such that remedies for previous
segregation no longer apply).
82. See supra, note 67.
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Powell's views on permissible race-conscious policies."8 3  The
appropriate level of review was explicitly an issue in Bakke, with
Powell asserting that the Court had always applied strict scrutiny to
racial classifications and must continue to do so. 84 In Grutter, the
issue was not whether to apply strict scrutiny - the majority held
that it was necessary to do so 85 - but whether the majority's
analysis actually deserved the name, "strict scrutiny." The
dissenters unanimously argued that the majority's scrutiny of the
admissions policy in question was far from strict.86
Under strict scrutiny, a racial classification must serve a
compelling state interest in order to survive constitutional muster.
One of the key elements in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is his
consideration of possible compelling state interests for affirmative
action. 87 Because it informs the holding that University of Michigan
Law School affirmative action program is legal,8 8 Justice O'Connor's
summary in Grutter of Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke may serve
as the official version and merits extended quotation.
83. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323. But see Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 ("We agree with the
plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has
never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that non-
remedial state interests will never justify racial classifications. Finally, the classification
of persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than
facilitates, the goals of equal protection.... No court since Bakke has accepted diversity
as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis. Indeed, recent Supreme
Court precedent shows that the diversity interest will not satisfy strict scrutiny.").
Patently, this analysis is no longer good law, given the express holding of both Grutter
and Gratz that diversity is a compelling state interest under strict scrutiny. Gratz, 539
U.S. at 268; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
84. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-91. See also, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct at 2751 ("It is well
established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of
individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny") (citing,
inter alia, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326).
85. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
86. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joining dissents by Rehnquist, J.,
and Thomas, J.); Court's deference to educational judgment of Michigan Law School is
"'antithetical to strict scrutiny." Id. at 356-57, 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "Although the
Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
unprecedented in its deference." Id. at 380 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); "The Court...
does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test
and its own controlling precedent." Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-316.
88. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 ("[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.").
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First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in "reducing the historic
deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools
and in the medical profession" as an unlawful interest in racial
balancing. Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in
remedying societal discrimination because such measures would
risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties "who
bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
special admissions program are thought to have suffered." Third,
Justice Powell rejected an interest in "increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved," concluding that even if such an interest could be
compelling in some circumstances the program under review was
not "geared to promote that goal."
Justice Powell approved the university's use of race to further
only one interest: "the attainment of a diverse student body."
With the important proviso that "constitutional limitations
protecting individual rights may not be disregarded," Justice
Powell grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that "long
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."
Justice Powell emphasized that nothing less than the "'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples."89
Justice O'Connor closed this section of the decision with the
assertion that "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use
of race in university admissions." 90
The point about deference to the academic freedom of
universities is central to O'Connor's reasoning. Where the
dissenters in Grutter asserted that the majority failed to follow
through on its promise of strict scrutiny, 91 O'Connor replied that
"[o]ur scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less
strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an
area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university." 92 In
other words, the Grutter majority believed that it had subjected the
law school's affirmative action program to strict scrutiny and found
that program constitutionally permissible. The extent of the Court's
willingness to defer to the expertise of university administrators
remains an open question, although the dissenters in Grutter
89. Id. at 324 (internal citations omitted).
90. Id. at 325.
91. See supra note 86. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Law
School's continued adherence to measures it knows produce racially skewed results is
not entitled to deference by this Court.").
92. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
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effectively asserted that such deference was already excessive, 93 and
a majority of the Court has since cabined it by asserting that it does
not extend to the actions of administrators at public elementary and
secondary schools. 94
B. Narrow Tailoring
Grutter v. Bollinger95 and Gratz v. Bollinger96 instantly made
Supreme Court history on the moment of their announcement.
Grutter upheld the affirmative action policy of the University of
Michigan Law School, while Gratz struck down the affirmative
action policy of the University of Michigan's undergraduate college.
Never before had a single litigant both won and lost cases on the
same issue on a single day. In both cases, plaintiffs asserted that
their failure to win admission to the respective schools resulted from
the use of racial classifications in admissions processes, which
precluded white applicants from competing on equal terms with
racial and ethnic minority applicants. 97 Such practice allegedly
violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.98
The issue of narrow tailoring determined the outcomes of the
two cases. Justice O'Connor, who voted with the majority in both
cases, emphasized that the distinction she saw between the two
programs lay in the capacity for individualized determination in the
law school's program that was lacking in the undergraduate
program.99 Individualized determination made the law school's
program sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. 100
The individualized determination ensured that, while race was a
factor in admissions decisions, it was not the overriding factor. 10'
Rather, it was one factor among many that the law school used in
order to admit students according to the policy goals, including
diversity, which the faculty had set.10 2 Using race as a plus factor in
93. See supra note 86.
94. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768
95. 539 U.S. 306 (2003), reh'g denied, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 982 (2003).
96. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
97. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
98. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249, 275; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317, 343-44.
99. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34. See also, Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J.
concurring) ("Unlike the law school admissions policy the Court upholds today in
Grutter v. Bollinger, the procedures employed by the University of Michigan's... Office
of Undergraduate Admissions do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of
applicants.") (citation omitted).
100. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-43.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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admissions did not have the effect of insulating racial and ethnic
minority applicants from the rest of the applicant pool, as a quota
would, 10 3 or as the automatic assignment of points in the
undergraduate program did.104
The key legal holding of the two cases, then, is that diversity
among the student population is a compelling state interest that can
justify a race-based affirmative action program even under strict
scrutiny, so long as the mechanism for achieving diversity is
narrowly tailored. 105  Although intervening plaintiffs in Gratz
asserted that the undergraduate program served to remedy
discrimination by the institution, the trial court dismissed that
claim, and the Supreme Court expressly sustained that dismissal.106
It is noteworthy that the problem with the argument for remediation
of past discrimination in Gratz was that the intervening plaintiffs
failed to provide any evidence for it, and the university "never
asserted" it "throughout the course of this litigation." 107 Nothing in
the Gratz opinion indicated that the Court was revisiting its
willingness to accept that justification where litigants could show
probative evidence for it. By contrast, in her Grutter opinion,
O'Connor took some pains to rehearse trial testimony asserting that
the purpose of the law school's affirmative action plan was not to
remedy past discrimination. 108
This was a key issue in the case. In O'Connor's summary,
"Applying strict scrutiny, the District Court determined that the law
school's asserted interest in assembling a diverse student body was
not compelling because 'the attainment of a racially diverse class...
was not recognized as such by Bakke and is not a remedy for past
discrimination.' '1 09 She later rejected this reasoning, asserting that
"we have never held that the only governmental use of race that can
103. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35.
104. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72. ("The current [undergraduate] policy does not provide
such individualized consideration. The [undergraduate] policy automatically distributes
20 points to every single applicant from an 'underrepresented minority' group, as
defined by the University. The only consideration that accompanies this distribution of
points is a factual review of an application to determine whether an individual is a
member of one of these minority groups."). "[T]he selection index, by setting up
automatic, predetermined point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the
diversity contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed. This policy stands
in sharp contrast to the law school's admissions plan, which enables admissions officers
to make nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each applicant is likely to
make to the diversity of the incoming class." Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325-27.
106. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257 n.9.
107. Id. (emphasis in original.).
108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319.
109. Id. at 321.
[Vol. 5
survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination." 110 Instead,
"we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining
a diverse student body. The Law School's educational judgment
that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer.""' After Grutter and Gratz, the law of the land is
that public universities11 2 may use racial classifications as part of
narrowly tailored programs that have as their purpose the
diversification of their student bodies.
For the Grutter majority, what made the law school's program
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster was the
claim that its goal was a "critical mass" of racial and ethnic
minority, and other underrepresented, students. 113 The majority
distinguished the achievement of such critical mass from a quota,
which Bakke forbade, 114 by characterizing it as "flexible."1 15 A quota
or similar program would be unacceptably rigid in insulating one
group from competition with others insofar as it set aside a specific
number of seats that only the favored group could occupy. 116 But
the majority was willing to defer to the law school in its claim that it
needed to admit a minimum percentage of racial and ethnic
minority students in order for the program to achieve its purpose.
As part of their insistence that the Law School's program was
no different from the undergraduate program, and therefore equally
illegal, Rehnquist 117 and Kennedy 1 8 asserted in dissent that the
notion of achieving a "critical mass" of racial and ethnic minority
students was merely a pretext for racial balancing. In joining the
110. Id. at 328. See also, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752 (asserting that the Court has
only ever approved use of racial classifications to remedy past discrimination, and to
achieve diversity in the student population of universities).
111. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
112. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 ("The Court in Grutter expressly articulated
key limitations on its holding - defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and
noting the unique context of higher education but these limitations were largely
disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments
in elementary and secondary schools. The present cases are not governed by Grutter.").
113. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36.
114. Id. at 334.
115. Id. at 337.
116. Id. at 334. But see Sander, supra note 12, at 405 (claiming that the Law School
system produces the same outcomes as the undergraduate system, making O'Connor's
distinction between the two spurious).
117. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Stripped of its 'critical mass'
veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial
balancing.").
118. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The dissenting opinion by The Chief Justice,
which I join in full, demonstrates beyond question why the concept of critical mass is a
delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in
most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.").
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dissents of Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, Scalia used the terms
"fabled" and "mystical" to characterize the "critical mass" claim.1 19
Rehnquist included in his dissent tables showing what he regarded
as a high consistency between the percentage of racial and ethnic
minorities among the applicants to the law school, and the
percentage of such students who actually received offers of
admission. 120 To the dissenters, this consistency disproved the Law
School's claim to use a flexible method that allowed for
individualized consideration toward the goal of achieving a critical
mass of students from underrepresented groups.
C. Sunset
As Justice Ginsburg explained in her Grutter concurrence 121 and
her Gratz dissent, 122 the rationale for race-based affirmative action is
that our nation's history of slavery and segregation left African
Americans woefully deficient in economic and cultural capital,
justifying preferences for them in various forms of state action for
the purpose of allowing them to catch up. Accounts of the origins of
affirmative action frequently quote the famous speech by President
Lyndon Johnson at Howard University's commencement on June 4,
1965: "But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars
of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, do
as you desire, choose the leaders you please." 123
But the argument that remedying past discrimination justifies
affirmative action is a chronologically specific justification. It invites
the query, if affirmative action is necessary now, and if it works,
119. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 539 U.S. at 384 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("the correlation between the
percentage of the Law School's pool of applicants who are members of the three
minority groups [African American, Hispanic, and Native American] and the percentage
of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be
dismissed as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to [the] numbers.").
See id. at 336 for the majority's riposte. Even if one accepts Rehnquist's empirical claim
about the correlation between the number of applicants and the number of admittees,
still it seems more plausible to believe that the University of Michigan Law School
administrators were simply doing what they claimed to do and doing it well than to
accuse them of duplicity.
121. Id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also, id. at 338 (majority opinion) ("By
virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality, such students are both likely to
have experiences of particular importance to the Law School's mission, and less likely to
be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.").
122. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 174 (Oxford University Press 1990); Philip C. Aka,
The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action in Public Education, with Special Reference to the
Michigan Cases, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 5 (2006).
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then it should become unnecessary at some point in the future.
Even Justice Marshall, in explaining why he thought affirmative
action programs remained necessary, implicitly accepted the
principle of chronological specificity. 24 In its most recent decision
regarding racial classifications in public education, the Court
asserted the lack of a determinate endpoint as one reason to strike
down the policies for assigning students in two school districts. 125
The Grutter decision asserts that "race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time.... Enshrining a permanent justification for
racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection
principle." 126  It goes on to predict that affirmative action in
university admissions will only be necessary for another twenty-five
years.127
This time limit is patently arbitrary, but it reflects the difficulty
of articulating a more robust standard for deciding when African
Americans have sufficiently caught up in order to justify eliminating
race-based affirmative action. In her concurrence in Grutter, Justice
Ginsburg suggests that numerical parity for African Americans in
admission to selective undergraduate and graduate programs
would be an important indicator that the time had come to cease
affirmative action.128 All agree that, if race-based affirmative action
policies are ever permissible, they must be finite.
Bad facts make bad law. The opinions in Grutter indicate that
everyone agreed: the University of Michigan Law School had
concocted a justification for its affirmative action program. The only
disagreement was over whether the Court should accept that
justification. 129 One of Richard Sander's key claims is that the Bakke
124. Croson, 488 U.S. at 552-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I ... do not believe this
Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial discrimination or its vestiges.").
125. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757-58.
126. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. See also, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986) ("In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect
the future.").
127. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. See Paul E. Peterson, Toward the Elimination of Race
Differences in Educational Achievement, in GENERATIONAL CHANGE: CLOSING THE TEST
SCORE GAP 2, 22 (Paul E. Peterson, ed., 2006) (using O'Connor's sunset requirement as
the reference point, arguing that data exists to determine what policies would eliminate
race differences in educational achievement, so the only real question is whether the
political will exists to implement those policies).
128. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-346 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129. See, e.g., Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I join the opinion of the Chief Justice.
As he demonstrates, the University of Michigan Law School's mystical 'critical mass'
justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind."). Id.
at 379 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Law School claims it must take the steps it does to
achieve a "'critical mass"' of underrepresented minority students. But its actual
program bears no relation to this asserted goal. Stripped of its 'critical mass' veil, the
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decision led university administrators to continue using technically
illegal affirmative action policies, but conceal the fact. 130 One result,
Sander suggests, has been a failure of research into affirmative
action at American law schools. 131 In Pre-Start at Emory, we have a
case study of a plain-speaking dean at a southern. law school who
aspired to make his a "front-ranking" 132 institution and created one
of the nation's first affirmative action programs, which began and
ended before Bakke. The next section of this article describes Pre-
Start.
III. Pre-Start
In contrast to the University of California at Davis and the
University of Michigan, Emory University could only implement an
affirmative action program in one of its professional schools after it
began admitting African-American students at all. In other words,
unlike UC Davis or Michigan, Emory could legitimately assert that
its affirmative action program served to correct for past
discrimination. 133 Emory was unusual among southern universities
in that its administrators sought integration, rather than fighting it.
In legal terms, where the university administrators in most
desegregation suits were the defendants,134 at Emory, the university
served as the plaintiff. Having contributed to the racial integration
of his university by serving as counsel in Emory v. Nash, however,
Emory Law School Dean Ben F. Johnson, Jr., remained dissatisfied
with his own school's inability to attract African-American
Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.")
(citation omitted).
130. Sander, supra note 12, at 385.
131. Id. at 372, 385.
132. Ben F. Johnson, Jr., Long Range Development Program, Part II, September 2, 1964,
Emory University School of Law, Ten-Year Program, 1965-75, in folder, "1964 Annual
Meeting - Board of Trustees - October 29 and 30," Box 7, Henry L. Bowden Office Files,
EUA. According to Johnson, "it is realistic, not fanciful, to propose that there can be
developed here in the southeast a law school approaching what has been developed
over the past 60 years in the mid-west at the University of Chicago." Id.
133. See supra, notes 89, 110 and accompanying text for discussion of this point in
current law.
134. See Meredith, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962), cert denied, Fair v. Meredith, 371 U.S. 828
(1962) (ordering district court to issue injunction requiring Univ. of Miss. to admit
African-American applicant); Holmes v. Danner, Registrar of the University of Georgia, 191
F. Supp. 394 (1961) (order prohibiting state officials from cutting off Univ. of Ga.'s state
appropriations if it admits African-American students); Lucy, et al. v. Adams, Dean of
Admissions, University of Alabama, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) (reversing trial court's stay of its own
injunction pending appeal to require Univ. of Ala. to admit African-American student).
See also cases cites supra, note 27.
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applicants. 135 Something more than desegregation simpliciter was
necessary.
In terms of the current debate, the following account of Pre-
Start at Emory belies Sander's summary of how affirmative action
policies came about and first operated.
There are many ironies in this state of affairs, but perhaps the
central irony is this: Law schools adopted racial preferences
because, soon after they began to seek actively in the 1960s to
increase black enrollment, they confronted the black-white
credentials gap. The schools conceived of preferential policies to
overcome the gap, hoping that by ignoring the differences in
credentials they could perhaps make the gap go away.136
Johnson and his colleagues at Emory did not simply ignore the
credentials gap between black and white applicants, nor did they
conceive of Pre-Start in such simplistic terms. 137  This is an
important point to make if only because many of the critics of
affirmative action write as if the creators of affirmative action
policies acted at best cynically, 138 perhaps even maliciously 139 - or,
135. Telephone interview with Michael DeVito, former professor of law, Emory
University, Jan. 15, 2007.
136. Sander, supra note 12, at 480. Sander does mention Pre-Start in a footnote, but
gives little information about it. Id. at 378 n.29. Of course, he could not give much
information about Pre-Start because little was available when he wrote. Even so, he
does not mention Gozansky and DeVito, supra note 39, who gives a detailed account of
Pre-Start.
137. Johnson did, however, offer a similar critique of the programs of the Council on
Legal Educational Opportunity ("CLEO"), which observers routinely compared Pre-
Start to at the time, since they were the two most prominent models of how to increase
African-American enrollment in law schools. See Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39. In
a draft report to the Field Foundation, Johnson wrote, "In substance, then, ours is a
unique program; it is different from CLEO and other programs which appear to have as
their objective to get black students in and through law school on a volume basis, as
'high-risk' students. I think we are all agreed that we do not wish to participate in this
sort of program." Letter from Ben Johnson, Dean of Emory Law School, to Leslie
Dunbar, Executive Director, Field Foundation, (July 1969), [hereinafter Dunbar letter], in
folder, "Pre-Start Program for Prospective Black Law Students, 1966-1969," Series 016,
Special Programs, box 1, Emory Law School Archives [hereinafter "ELSA"] (reporting on
Pre-Start). See also letter from Leslie Dunbar, Executive Director, Field Foundation, to
Constance L. Dupre, Legal Services Program, Office of Economic Opportunity (Nov. 6,
1967), in folder, "Law School, 1966-71," box 2, Ward files, EUA ("The Emory plan takes
the Negro college and its degree seriously, puts the student on the real track, and allows
him to prove himself against a standard of the real world. The Harvard plan, on the
other hand, is one of the myriad of recent outcroppings of the moral unease of American
universities, beset by the demands of the Negro question and their own historically
achieved remoteness from it. What so many of these actions have in common is the offer
by college A to give remedial, non-credit, instruction to college B's students.").
138. Sander, supra note 12, at 405 ("It may be that Justice O'Connor did not
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more charitably, as in Hopwood14 and in Thomas' Grutter dissent, 141
in a well meaning but badly misguided way. Pre-Start was a very
thoughtful program, and Ben Johnson considered it a success.
A. How Pre-Start Worked 142
Two full academic years, 1963-64 and 1964-65, would elapse
between Emory v. Nash and the arrival of the first full-time 143
understand that the law school and college admissions systems were functionally
identical in their treatment of race, due perhaps to weaknesses in the plaintiff's
presentation. Or it may be that Justice O'Connor cared only about form, not substance.
We should perhaps infer that racially segregated admissions, or large, fixed numerical
boosts awarded on the basis of race, are fine so long as they are not specifically
identified as such in the admissions office's public pronouncements (or in sworn
testimony before a court).").
139. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I also join Parts I through VII of
Justice Thomas's opinion. I find particularly unanswerable his central point: that the
allegedly 'compelling state interest' at issue here is not the incremental 'educational
benefit' that emanates from the fabled 'critical mass' of minority students, but rather
Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school whose normal admissions
standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities.").
140. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934 ("With the best of intentions, in order to increase the
enrollment of certain favored classes of minority students, the University of Texas
School of Law ('the law school') discriminates in favor of those applicants by giving
substantial racial preferences in its admissions program.").
141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I believe blacks can achieve in
every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators.
Because I wish to see all students succeed whatever their color, I share, in some respect,
the sympathies of those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the
University of Michigan Law School. The Constitution does not, however, tolerate
institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions policies when such devotion
ripens into racial discrimination.").
142. Various accounts of the Pre-Start Program and its origins exist. See Ben F.
Johnson and Michael D. DeVito, Emory University School of Law Progress Report to The
Field Foundation: Pre-Start Program for Prospective Negro Law Students, Nov. 10, 1966
[hereinafter Progress Report]; Ben F. Johnson and Michael D. DeVito, Emory University
School of Law Report to the Field Foundation: 1966-67 Pre-Start Program for Prospective Negro
Law Students, Oct. 1967 [hereinafter 1967 Report to Field Foundation] both in folder, "Pre-
Start Program," box 14, Ward files, EUA; Ben F. Johnson and Nathaniel E. Gozansky,
Emory University School of Law Report to the Field Foundation: 1969 Pre-Start Program for
Prospective Black Law Students, Jan. 1970 [hereinafter 1969 Report to Field Foundation], in
folder, "Pre-Start Program for Prospective Black Law Students," Series 016, Special
Programs records, box 1, ELSA; Letter, Ben Johnson to Jim Sibley, June 16, 1971
[hereinafter Sibley letter], describing Pre-Start, in folder, "Law School, 1966-71," box 2,
Ward files, EUA.
143. Ted Smith was the first African American to matriculate in the Emory Law
School. He enrolled in the evening program. Judge Marvin Arrington noted Smith as
his predecessor during remarks at the annual Emory Black Law Students' Association
Banquet, Mar. 8, 2007, Atlanta, Ga. Under Johnson's direction, Emory Law School
eliminated its evening program because "... the operation of the Evening Division is a
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African-American students, Marvin Arrington and Clarence Cooper,
at Emory Law School. Arrington and Cooper were both transfer
students from Howard University in Washington, D.C.144 Both
enrolled in the fall semester of 1965.145 But the problem remained
that the most highly qualified African-American students typically
also applied to, got accepted to, and attended more prestigious
schools. 146  The persistent problem with African-American
applicants to Emory was that their scores on the LSAT were below
Emory's usual standard.147
As Johnson explained of the first participants in Pre-Start, their
scores "average[d] 369 against our regular beginning class average
of 545; in terms of national percentile rating this was the difference
between the 12th percentile and the 69th."148 After three years of
the program, Emory law professors Nathaniel Gozansky and
Michael DeVito reported on thirty-five students who had
participated in Pre-Start through 1968. For those students, the mean
LSAT score was 355, the median was 368.149 Over the same period,
the mean LSAT for all entering Emory Law students was 567.150
The solution to the problem of deficient LSAT scores from
African-American applicants that Dean Johnson developed, in
conjunction with Professor DeVito, was Pre-Start, which the Emory
Law School operated each summer from 1966 through 1972. The
idea behind Pre-Start was to eliminate the LSAT as an admission
requirement, substituting the candidates' actual performance in a
law school course that was ordinary in every respect except that it
would occur during the summer, and all of the students in the class
would be African-American candidates.'51 DeVito would teach the
course. Any candidate who scored seventy or above would be
eligible for admission as a regular student in the law school during
hindrance to the development of the Law School as the faculty would like to see it
developed." Emory Law School Annual Report to the President, 1966-67 at 29, EUA; see also
Emory Law School Annual Report to the President, 1967-68 at 37, EUA.
144. See John D. Thomas, A Legal Precedent, EMORY MAG., Autumn 1998 (story about
Marvin Arrington, describing his arrival with Clarence Cooper at the Law School in
1965), available at http://www.emory.edu/EMORYMAGAZINE/autumn98/marvin.
html.
145. Id.
146. Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, at 720.
147. Id.
148. Sibley letter, supra note 142. See also, Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, at 721 for
discussion of reasons, that have nothing to do with academic ability, why African
Americans might not do well on LSAT.
149. Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, at 737.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 729.
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the following fall. 152 Their completion of the summer class would
count toward the credits they needed to graduate, giving them the
apparent advantage 153 of a one-course reduction relative to the rest
of the students during their first year.154 Recognizing that not only
the LSAT, but also the cost of law school, likely constituted a major
impediment for many of the target students, Johnson also proposed
to provide the students with grants for both the summer study, and
for their first year of law school. 155 Afterward, Pre-Start students
would have to "resort to the usual student aid and loan programs
available to law students generally."156
Emory's proximity to the Atlanta University complex of
African-American colleges and universities proved helpful in
getting Pre-Start running. Johnson and DeVito consulted with
Melvin D. Kennedy of Morehouse and Samuel D. Cook of Atlanta
University in developing the program.157  During the 1970-71
academic year, Gozansky would take half-time leave in order to
serve as associate director of the Council of Legal Educational
Opportunity ("CLEO") with Kennedy. 158 During the first year,
Emory offered positions in Pre-Start to twelve students, all but three
of whom came from Atlanta institutions: two each from Atlanta
University and Clark, Morehouse, and Morris Brown Colleges, one
from Spelman College.159 The other three came from the Tuskegee
Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama. Talladega College, in Talladega,
Alabama, recommended one student who withdrew after initially
accepting the appointment. South Carolina College, in Orangeburg,
152. Ben F. Johnson, Emory University School of Law Proposal: A "Pre-Start" Program for
Prospective Negro Law Students, Jan. 7, 1966, at 4 [hereinafter Pre-Start Proposal], reprinted
in Progress Report, supra note 142, at app. A.
153. See Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, at 729-30. They assert that, even with the
course reduction, many Pre-Start students earned unexpectedly low grades during their
first regular quarter of study. Id. Those students typically rebounded, however, earning
better grades in subsequent quarters. Gozansky & DeVito speculated that the summer
course gave the Pre-Start students an inaccurate sense of the amount of effort required to
succeed in law school, but that the shock of their first-quarter grades was enough to
disabuse them. Id.
154. Pre-Start Proposal, supra note 152, at 4.
155. Id. at 2, 6.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 8.
158. Memorandum from Ben F. Johnson, Dean of Emory Law School, to Judson C.
Ward, Vice President of Emory University (Mar. 31, 1970), in folder, "Law School, 1966-
71," Ward files, EUA. CLEO was originally a Great Society program that served to
increase the number of African-American attorneys mostly as an anti-poverty program.
It has since flourished and continues to exist. See CLEO, http://www.cleoscholars.com.
159. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 11. Although these students all attended
Atlanta institutions, they hailed not only from Georgia, but from Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Florida, and Mississippi. Id.
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South Carolina, recommended no student, perhaps because the
amount of time between confirmation of the grant and the start of
the actual program was quite short, leaving officials there too little
time to respond. 60 In subsequent years, as word of the program
spread and as Emory law professors DeVito and Gozansky recruited
systematically at historically African-American institutions, the pool
of potential participants increased, including the variety of sending
institutions. 161
Student selection was inherently a problem. The express goal
was to identify students who would likely succeed in law school,
but who had performed too poorly on the LSAT to win admission to
an accredited program. The solution was to ask pre-law advisors at
the sending institutions to choose the participants. During the first
year, 1966, some of the students did not even take the LSAT until
the summer of their participation in Pre-Start. As the Progress
Report stated, "fortunately for the reliability of the experiment, each
student selected... would not have been eligible for admission
under conventional procedures because of substandard LSAT
scores."
162
DeVito and Gozansky altered details of the program over the
years as they learned from experience. 63 Overall, however, the Pre-
Start program remained essentially the same for seven years. The
single biggest exception was 1968, the year in which Emory
participated in the beginning of the CLEO program. The number of
students who initially enrolled in Pre-Start was twelve in every year
except 1967, when it was eleven, and 1968, when it was 40. The
lowest percentage of successful students - that is, of Pre-Start
participants who scored well enough to enroll in law school - was
58.3, or seven out of twelve, in 1970. In 1968, the CLEO year, 37 of
40 students succeeded, for a rate of 92.5 percent.1 64 The 1968 CLEO
class was unusual not only for its size, but for the range of law
schools besides Emory that successful participants earned admission
to, including Temple, Texas, Berkeley/Boalt Hall, Georgetown, and
Yale.165
Pre-Start students were always free to apply to other law
schools, but one key difference between Pre-Start and CLEO was the
expectation in Pre-Start that most or all Pre-Start students would
matriculate at Emory, while CLEO assumed little or no correlation
160. Id.
161. See 1969 Report, supra note 142, at 2.
162. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 10.
163. Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, passim.
164. See chart, School of Law Annual Report to the President, 1969-70 at 36, EUA; Sibley
letter, supra note 142.
165. School of Law Annual Report to the President, 1967-68, supra note 143, at 29.
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between the law school the students attended for the summer
program and the law school that they would matriculate at. The
reason why the total number of students in the program was much
lower for all of the Pre-Start years than it was for the CLEO year is
that Emory hoped to admit all of the Pre-Start participants as
regular students, so Emory administrators had to regulate
admission to Pre-Start according to the number of students they
could subsequently absorb into the incoming class. 166
In 1971, Johnson reported that Emory had enrolled a total of 99
students in Pre-Start/CLEO. 167  Twelve of those students were
enrolled at the time of the report, leaving 87 for whom Johnson
knew the outcome. Seventy-one succeeded - that is, performed
well enough to gain admission to a law school - while sixteen did
not, for a success rate of 82 percent. Of the seventy-one successful
students, twenty-nine enrolled at other law schools, while forty-one
enrolled at Emory. 168 Of those forty-one, fourteen left without
graduating, 169 two transferred to other law schools, nine were
current students, and eighteen graduated from Emory. 170 Johnson
also reported that, of all African-American graduates from Emory
Law School, a total of twenty-eight at that time (including those
African-American students who did not come through Pre-Start),
sixteen had passed some state's bar exam, nine were preparing to
166. See supra note 137 for Johnson's critical evaluation of CLEO as compared to Pre-
Start.
167. Sibley letter, supra note 142.
168. Id. What happened to the 71st student is unclear. This may have been a
typographical error.
169. One of the problems Sander identifies with current affirmative action programs
is high attrition rates for under-qualified students. See Sander, supra note 12, at 370, 379,
436, 440-41. Fourteen departures of 41 students constitutes an attrition rate of 34
percent, which is extremely high. From his LSAC-BPS data, Sander finds attrition rates
of 8.2 percent for whites and 19.2 percent for blacks. Id. at 436. In table 5.7, Sander
shows that African-American students with index scores of 400 and below - a score at
which virtually no white applicant gets admitted to any law school - have an attrition
rate of 39.6 percent. Id. at 441. For African-American students with index scores
between 400 and 460, the attrition rate is 33.1%. Id. But at that level, the attrition rate for
whites is 22.2 percent, and the difference between the African American and white rates
steadily declines as index scores grow. Id. Even at the 400-460 level, I do not consider
the difference in the attrition rates that impressive. Sander anticipates this response and
insists that one problem with attrition is that it correlates strongly with law school
grades, which in turn correlate strongly with bar passage. Id. at 442. This is certainly the
sort of information that should be available to African-American prospective law
students, but it also fails to decide the policy issue. In a culture that values individual
risk as the putative source of innovation and achievement, what if African-American
prospective law students know the odds and still want the opportunity?
170. Sibley letter, supra note 142. Again, these figures do not add up properly: 18 + 14
+ 9 + 2 = 43, not 41. Perhaps one of the extra students here is the missing student from
note 168?
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take a bar exam, and the outcome for three was unknown.171 Even if
one assumes that the three unknowns failed, the pass rate for
African-American graduates of Emory Law was 84.2 percent based
on these figures. Writing in 1970, Johnson claimed a first-try pass
rate of "over 85%" for Emory Law graduates as a whole, 72 so the
bar passage rate for African Americans was consistent with the rate
for the entire school in this period.173
Johnson and DeVito were at pains to insist that the intent of
Pre-Start was not "compensatory." 74 They defined "compensatory"
to mean "a program to make up for deficiencies in prior
education." 175  This claim reflects their strong belief that the
problem with admission of African-American students to law school
lay not with the students or their educational backgrounds, but with
the LSAT. They repeatedly described Pre-Start as, inter alia, an
experiment to evaluate the LSAT's reliability. 176 In the preliminary
report to the Field Foundation, they asserted that the first nine Pre-
Start students to enroll at Emory Law School would not have
secured admission to an accredited law school otherwise. 177
However, those students, "selected without regard to conventional
admission criteria, are substantially overperforming what might
have been predicted by such criteria."178
171. Sibley letter, supra note 142. This is particularly important information insofar as
one of Sander's chief claims is that African Americans who attend higher-tier schools
than they would otherwise based on their application criteria tend to have more trouble
passing bar exams than they would otherwise. Sander, supra note 12, at 373, 443-45,
172. Letter from Ben F. Johnson, Dean of Emory Law School, to Lt. Col. Ross M.
Goddard, Jr., Directorate of Military Support, Dept. of the Army (Dec. 11, 1970), (in
folder), "Law School, 1966-71," box 2, Ward files, EUA [hereinafter Letter to Goddard].
173. I should note here my recognition that, even if I find some other source with
which to verify these numbers, the sample size is far too small for valid statistical
generalizations. The temptation to run these numbers is impossible to resist, however. I
assume that any reader will want to know. Further, their appearance in various
documents that Johnson wrote - not only official reports to the President of the
University, but also in letters - indicates that he considered them significant, so they
help to understand his motives for and opinions about Pre-Start.
174. See, e.g., 1969 Report, supra note 142, at 1.
175. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 7.
176. Id. at 3, 5; 1969 Report, supra note 142, at 1; Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, at
721.
177. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 2.
178. Id. But see Sander, supra note 12, at 424 ("A number of careful studies, stretching
back into the 1970s, have demonstrated that average black performance in the first year
of law school does not exceed levels predicted by academic indicators. If anything,
blacks tend to underperform in law school relative to their numbers, a trend that holds
true for other graduate programs and undergraduate colleges."). Of course, if Pre-Start
students would not have gained admission to an accredited law school at all based on
their application credentials, then passing by the skin of their teeth at Emory Law would
qualify as "overperformance."
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B. Ben Johnson, Evangelist of Legal Education
Pre-Start's function as a test of the LSAT's reliability for African
Americans was subsidiary to its primary goal. Johnson saw
considerable inherent value in increasing the number of African-
American attorneys in the South, and he saw Pre-Start as a useful
vehicle for this purpose. Recall here Justice Powell's discussion of
potential justifications for racial classifications in the Bakke
opinion.179 As O'Connor reiterated in her summary, Powell did not
actually reject the possibility of using affirmative action to increase
the number of professionals practicing in underserved areas. 180 He
noted instead that the admissions program at the UC Davis School
of Medicine did not seem to have that goal as its purpose.181 Pre-
Start emphatically did have that goal as its purpose.
Johnson's explanation of his reason for wanting to increase the
number of African-American attorneys in the South sounds
patronizing to the modern ear, but it also reflects his faith in the
value of the American legal system, at least insofar as the legal
system could eliminate its racist practices. Johnson's justification for
increasing the number of African-American lawyers, as stated to the
Field Foundation, is worth quoting at length.
Unfortunately, there are segments of our society - the lower
socio-economic groups, of which the Negro community is only
one - which are suspect or even hostile to the rule of law,
particularly in its implementation and operation with respect to
their people. Simply stated, they believe the law is their
oppressor and their enemy. One confirmation of this, in their
eyes, at least, is that practically none, or at most only a few, of
their people are involved as lawyers in the development of law
and administration of justice; they naturally conclude, consciously
or subconsciously, that neither the law nor the legal profession is
for them or their kind.
The Program proceeds on the assumption that a witness to these
people is needed concerning the importance of the rule of law in
our society, and that this witness can best be made by persons of a
kindred background whose education in law and participation in
the legal profession will speak for itself.182
179. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-16.
180. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324. See supra note 89 and accompanying text for discussion.
181. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-16; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324.
182. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 5-6. Compare Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 403
(1987) ("1 think what I saw in the eyes of those who reached out to me in the hallways of
the courthouse was a profoundly accurate sense of helplessness - a knowledge that
without a sympathetically effective lawyer (whether judge, prosecutor or defense
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Johnson was, in short, an evangelist of legal education.
This statement indicates that Johnson saw African Americans as
a monolithic bloc who would respond reliably to a widely accepted
leadership class. 183 The evidence indicates that he was wrong on
this point. As early as the sit-ins, which lasted in Atlanta from
March 1960 through March 1961 (actual desegregation occurred in
September 1961), disputes emerged between established African-
American leaders and newer, more militant leaders. 184 But Johnson
was making a point here more about the legal system, and by
implication American government as a whole, than about African
Americans. His concern was that, in practice, the options were
either to take vigorous steps to improve African Americans'
representation in legal and political systems, or face a stark choice
between increasing lawlessness and increasing police power.
A key concern that Johnson never mentioned explicitly, 185 but
attorney) they would be lining those halls and those of the lock-up for a long time to
come. I probably got more than my fair share of outstretched arms because I was one of
the few people of color in the system at that time; but just about every lawyer who has
frequented the courthouse enough has had the experience of being cast as a saviour.").
See also Sander, supra note 12, at 376-77 (describing attitude similar to Johnson's among
other law school administrators during this period).
183. This assumption itself presents a potential legal problem, although it may be
permissible for officials in a private institution to make such assumptions in ways that
public officials may not. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.
Ct. 2594, 2618 (2006) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)) ("The
recognition of nonracial communities of interest reflects the principle that a State may
not 'assum[e] from a group of voters' race that they 'think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."'). See also Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The dabbling in political theory that
dilution cases have prompted, however, is hardly the worst aspect of our vote dilution
jurisprudence. Far more pernicious has been the Court's willingness to accept the one
underlying premise that must inform every minority vote dilution claim: the assumption
t'i at the group asserting dilution is not merely a racial or ethnic group, but a group
having distinct political interests as well. Of necessity, in resolving vote dilution actions
we have given credence to the view that race defines political interest. We have acted on
the implicit assumption that members of racial and ethnic groups must all think alike on
important matters of public policy and must have their own 'minority preferred'
representatives holding seats in elected bodies if they are to be considered represented at
all.").
184. Jack L. Walker, Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta,
in ATLANTA, GEORGIA, 1960-1961: SIT-INS AND STUDENT ACTIVISM, supra note 47, at 31.
Many authors have noted growing tensions among African-American leaders in this
period. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo, Race, Public Opinion, and the Social Sphere, 61 PUB.
OPINION Q. 1, 3 (1997) (noting empirical evidence for significant variation in opinion
among racial and ethnic minority groups, cautioning against assuming uniformity).
185. Johnson did indicate his attention to what he called "the signals emanating from
black student unrest throughout the country," and explained what Emory Law School
was doing to respond to those signals even as he insisted that no such unrest had
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which must have been part of his thinking, was the outbreak of riots
by African Americans in major cities with distressing regularity
each summer from 1965 through 1968.186 As Hugh Graham has
demonstrated, the riots had a direct, if somewhat unpredictable,
effect on Congress and federal legislation. 187 Graham also explains
that Nixon's much-reported "Southern Strategy" was really more a
border-state strategy, as he calculated that any appeal for the die-
hard segregationist vote - requiring direct competition with
George Wallace - would cost more in moderate support than it was
worth.1 88 Generalized calls for law and order on behalf of the "silent
majority" fit this strategy perfectly, allowing Nixon to articulate the
fears of many voters, South and North, without making explicit
reference to the politics of race. 189
Although the concern must have been much the same, Ben
Johnson's response to the problem differed dramatically from
Nixon's. Johnson pointed out that, of 5,000 lawyers registered with
the State Bar of Georgia at the time (he gives no date), only thirty-
four were African American. Of those, twelve worked for the
federal government. Johnson assumed that the remaining twenty-
two were in private practice. 190 He considered the mere fact of
segregation inherently unfair at least in part because of his religious
beliefs. 191 But Johnson also had the very lawyerly perspective that
occurred at ELS. Dunbar letter, supra note 137.
186. See Sander, supra note 12, at 378 (impact of race riots during the 1960s as impetus
for affirmative action programs in law schools). This is also where Sander mentions Pre-
Start as an exception, having begun before the riots became a pattern. Sander's
chronology is correct, as is his characterization of Pre-Start as exceptional, but I suspect
that Johnson's understanding of the situation dated back at least to the sit-ins of 1960-61.
187. GRAHAM, supra note 123, at 175, 255-77, 268 ("The tough-minded 90th Congress
was primarily interested in cracking down on the nationwide escalation of violence,
including both ghetto riots and southern violence against civil rights workers.").
188. Id. at 303.
189. See MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE
SUNBELT SOUTH (Princeton University Press 2006) (exploring how school desegregation
contributed to moves by whites to suburbs, and to the Republican Party, in several
southern cities, including Atlanta, during the 1960s and 1970s); Robert A. Levine, The
Silent Majority: Neither Simple nor Simple-Minded, 35 PUB. OPINION Q. 571 (1971-72)
(arguing that most white Americans don't mind living in racially integrated
neighborhoods, but not as the minority, which is why they tell pollsters that they do not
mind integrated neighborhoods, but often oppose open-housing initiatives); Charles
Morgan, Jr., Politics, Race, and the Law: The Southern Strategy, 1 BLACK POLITICIAN 8 (1970)
(arguing that Nixon tried to win southern votes by appealing to both whites and blacks).
See also Tali Mendelberg, Executing Hortons: Racial Crime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign,
61 PUB. OPINION Q. 134 (1997) (quantitative study showing that infamous Willie Horton
ads supporting George H.W. Bush for President in 1988 worked by invoking viewers'
racial prejudice, not concern about crime).
190. Mendelberg, supra note 189. See also Sibley letter supra note 142.
191. Telephone interview with Michael DeVito, former professor of law, Emory
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the absence of African-American attorneys necessarily undermined
the legitimacy of the legal system.
Reporting on Pre-Start in 1969, Johnson placed it into the larger
context of integration generally at Emory Law School. He predicted
that:
[W]e will have 20-30 black students in law school here regularly.
This is a comfortable size for us. It is large enough for the white
students and faculty to know that we must adapt and learn how
to get along more effectively with black students; in other words,
we cannot deal with integration as a casual matter or on a token
basis. From the black students' standpoint it is large enough to
provide them with a core of black friends with common problems
as a buttress against loneliness, etc. I am convinced that the worst
thing that can happen is to encourage the enrollment of one, two,
or three black students in a predominantly white law school
where they will inevitably be treated either too casually or too
patronizingly and inevitably feel their alienation more bitterly;
this kind of integration is worse than no integration.192
This, of course, is the concept of "critical mass" that dissenters
in Grutter so roundly denounced. 193 It demonstrates the extent to
which the Justices who chose to play at being law school
administrators for purposes of deriding affirmative action had little
or no actual information about the issue.
Johnson knew whereof he spoke on this issue. Just two months
before he wrote, a group of African-American undergraduate
students had staged protests at Emory precisely to publicize their
sense that the university needed to work more vigorously to achieve
genuine racial integration, beyond simply admitting African
Americans as students. 194  Whatever he thought about those
University (January 15, 2007). Johnson's grandson, Ben F. Johnson, IV, reported the
following anecdote about his grandfather: when the Druid Hills Baptist Church, which
Johnson attended, "integrated" by allowing African Americans only into the basement
for worship services, Johnson organized a group of white congregants to sit in the
basement with them as a protest. Mary J. Loftus, A Life of Courage and Commitment,
EMORY MAG.. Autumn 2006, at 37.
192. Dunbar letter, supra note 137.
193. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting); See also id at 379 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Stripped of its 'critical mass' veil, the Law School's program is revealed as
a naked effort to achieve racial balancing"); id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
dissenting opinion by The Chief Justice, which I join in full, demonstrates beyond
question why the concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask
its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical
goals indistinguishable from quotas."). See supra note 120 and accompanying text for
discussion.
194. See Complaint, Emory University v. Steve Abbott, et al. (May 25, 1969, Superior
Court for County of DeKalb, Ga.), in folder, "Desegregation," box 19, Ward files, EUA
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students' methods - and the decision to secure an injunction
against them caused substantial disagreement among other Emory
administrators195 - Johnson showed a remarkable willingness and
ability to hear what African-American students at Emory wanted
and needed, and to respond to their demands in a constructive
way. 196
In doing so, Johnson and his faculty strove to reconcile the
demand for racial integration with the larger interests of Emory Law
School, Emory University, and the rest of the student body. This is
the balancing of competing demands that administrators routinely
engage in, but which the dissenters in Grutter seem completely
ignorant of. Describing Pre-Start, Gozansky and DeVito explained
that "[r]ecruitment is concentrated in the South. This decision is
based on the theory that the place which is in most need of black
attorneys is the South."197 This stands in sharp contrast to Emory
Law School's general recruitment practices during this period. In
1969, Johnson conveyed to university administrators a memo from
the law school's recruitment committee asserting flatly that Emory
already attracted all of the highly qualified students it could get
from the South, necessitating recruitment in other regions.198
Insofar as it was successful, of course, Emory Law School would
then be responsible for increasing the likelihood that highly
qualified law students, having attended law school in Atlanta,
would remain in Atlanta, thereby either diluting Atlanta's identity
(detailing events of protest and requesting restraining order enjoining further protests
pending hearing). Just over one year later, Johnson would also report with some pride
that the effort to encourage a nationwide student strike in response to news of the
invasion of Cambodia had met with no success at Emory Law School. Letter to
Goddard, supra note 172.
195. Memorandum from E. Jerome Zeller, Dean of Students, to Sanford Atwood,
President of Emory University (May 27, 1969) (objecting strenuously to service of
restraining order on students) ("You now proceed fully against my personal principles
and my professional advice."), in folder, "Black Students," box 11, Ward files, EUA.
196. See, e.g., supra note 185. With regard to the rest of Emory, beyond the law school,
see correspondence between President Sanford Atwood and representatives of Black
Student Alliance ("BSA") (July 17, 1969) and notes of meeting between various Emory
administrators, including President Atwood, and BSA representatives (July 24, 1969), in
folder, "Black Students," box 11, Ward files, EUA.
197. Gozansky & DeVito, supra note 39, at 724.
198. See memorandum from Ben F. Johnson, Dean of Emory Law School, to Sanford
Atwood, President of Emory University (Nov. 11, 1969) (conveying memo from
Professor Stubbs to Law School Recruiting Committee, (Oct. 28, 1969) in folder, "Law
School, 1966-71," box 2, Ward files, EUA) ("The foregoing information concerning
southern schools and the evaluated quality of their programs and their students
suggests some of the difficulty in developing a first quality student body from the South
alone.") [hereinafter Johnson Memo to Atwood, 1969]. See also School of Law Annual
Report to the President, 1969-70, supra note 143, at 29.
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as a southern city, or perpetuating its historical role as an
ambivalently southern city. 199
The recruitment committee memo indicated that only one
southern state, Virginia, could claim an average LSAT score for its
residents, 525, that exceeded the national average, 517.200 Florida's
average was 516, Georgia's was 497.201 For students entering Emory
Law School in fall 1961, the average score for those who took the
LSAT (seventy-seven of ninety, thirteen did not take the test) was
501.202 By the time Pre-Start began in 1966, the average score for
students entering Emory Law School was 545.203 Virtually any
significant success by Pre-Start students demonstrates that anyone
who judged solely by LSAT scores was missing an important pool of
qualified potential students from the South in African Americans.
This data also indicates the extent to which the South's peculiar
history continued to manifest, inter alia, in poor academic
performance, not just among African Americans, but generally. 20 4 A
necessary implication of Pre-Start, in the context of Emory Law's
larger recruitment strategy at the time, was that, in order to find
more qualified white students, Emory had to look outside the South,
while they had only begun to tap the well of qualified African-
American students within the South. 205
Emory Law School's recruitment strategy in this period is also
further illustration of the point that quantitative data alone cannot
resolve these issues because one's interpretive frame has a profound
impact on how one reads the data. Melissa Kean writes about
Goodrich C. White, President of Emory from 1942 to 1957, and his
military service in the World War I period.
[White] administered intelligence tests to southerners, both black
and white, in an effort to identify those who were unfit for
military duty. This effort would yield results that deeply puzzled
199. See supra, note 43 and accompanying text.
200. Johnson Memo to Atwood, 1969, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. Law School Annual Report to the President, 1961-62 at 20, EUA.
203. See supra, note 148 and accompanying text.
204. See Conkin, supra note 32, at 3.
205. Recall that, although the first group of Pre-Start students came entirely from
colleges and universities in the South, they grew up all over the country, supra note 159,
so this is something of an exaggeration. To some extent, what Emory accomplished with
white students - attracting highly qualified applicants to Atlanta from outside the
South - it also accomplished with black students. At least one African-American
graduate of ELS who entered some time after Pre-Start ended, and who grew up in
western Massachusetts, made clear that an important part of his decision to attend
Emory was his perception that Atlanta was a good place for an African American to live.
Interview with Kevin Ross, Kevin Ross and Associates, in Atlanta, GA. (Oct. 3, 2007).
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the analysts who would spend years trying to explain them away:
many black soldiers from the North scored higher than southern
white farmers. These results apparently fascinated White, who
kept his original copies of some of the early reports in his files. 206
Perhaps most importantly, the data again suggest that scores on
"standardized" tests reflect more the educational and other cultural
opportunities the test-takers have had in their lives than any
inherent ability.20 7
In the initial grant application to the Field Foundation, Johnson
represented Pre-Start as imposing a certain opportunity cost on
Emory Law School, which was already enrolling "the maximum
number of students it can physically handle," 20 8 with "relatively
high" admissions qualifications coming in.209 In terms of the current
debate, this necessarily means that Pre-Start students took seats that
would otherwise have gone to qualified white students. 210
But Johnson also identified various benefits to the law school as
an institution, and to the white students who made up its more
traditional constituency. "While there is a tendency to focus on the
Program's benefit to the pre-start students, their presence in the Law
School has brought an easily overlooked value to the student body
at large." 211 As a specific example, Johnson noted, "[t]he students
are facing the problem of integrating their legal fraternities, and a
great deal of responsible and mature thought and action has been
generated because of this."212 In other words, Pre-Start "aspire[d] to
'achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of
206. Kean, supra note 22, at 34. Compare THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra
note 16.
207. See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
SCORE GAP, supra note 16, at 64 ("Psychologists have been trying to measure intelligence
since the late nineteenth century. The tests they have used for this purpose have not
changed much since World War I and have hardly changed at all since World War II.
But while the tests have not changed much, psychologists' understanding of what the
tests measure has changed substantially. Instead of thinking that intelligence tests
measure biological potential, psychologists now think of them as measuring developed
abilities."). See also Richard E. Nisbett, Race, Genetics, and IQ, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
SCORE GAP 88-103, supra note 16 (asserting that relevant studies show more
environmental than genetic influence in determining intelligence).
208. A consistent theme, beginning with the 1964-65 annual report and continuing
through to the completion of Gambrell Hall in 1972, was the need for a new building to
provide much-needed space.
209. Pre-Start Proposal, supra note 143, at 6-7.
210. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
211. Progress Report, supra note 142, at 20.
212. Id.
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its parts.' ' 213
Perhaps the most important part of Johnson's perspective, then,
is that, while Pre-Start's most obvious beneficiaries were the
African-American students who had an opportunity to attend law
school that they might not otherwise have had, the benefits of the
program spread much wider. Emory Law School's supererogatory
efforts to attract African-American students from 1966 to 1972
benefited the other students who attended the school with them, the
legal system as a whole, and therefore, by extension, the society as a
whole.214
Gozansky and DeVito chose not to specify exactly why they
believed the need for African-American attorneys was greatest in
the South. The answer seems obvious; most of the African
Americans in the United States lived in the South, and southern
states uniquely had statutes requiring racial segregation. 2 5 But one
can also infer the logic Gozansky and DeVito used from the fact that
they served for several years as faculty advisors to the Emory
Chapter of the Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, 216 "a
nation-wide movement of law students to aid attorneys engaged in
civil rights litigation by doing legal research and brief writing."217
Ben Johnson and at least a significant segment of his faculty, that is,
were explicitly on the side of the African Americans in the struggle
213. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
214. Johnson's observations about the general benefit of Pre-Start reveal the obvious,
egregious flaw in the reasoning of Justice Scalia's dissent in Grutter. Scalia argues that
nothing about diversity as a goal for public universities differentiates it from diversity as
a goal in all the other activities of state government, offering as proof the fact that
students earn no grades based on their understanding of or commitment to diversity. In
his view, no principle exists by which to cabin diversity within universities as a
compelling state interest, such that other state entities may now claim it for such
purposes as hiring preferences. 539 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But graded
courses alone are not the defining characteristic of universities' educational programs.
Many of the key lessons that college students learn as undergraduates involve basic
principles of maturity and responsibility that no one grades them on, but which can
dramatically affect their grades insofar as they fail to learn those lessons. These are also
lessons that employers, including state government, assume that college graduates will
already have learned before they become employees. Law students must take courses
in, indeed an entire examination in, professional responsibility, which necessarily
involves issues responsible interaction with clients. What Scalia and Thomas resolutely
refuse to acknowledge is that effective education is about much more than what
happens in individual classes.
215. See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text.
216. Law School Annual Report to the President, 1966-67, supra note 143, at 5; Law School
Annual Report to the President 1967-68, supra note 143, at 23; Law School Annual Report to
the President, 1968-69 at 25, EUA; Law School Annual Report to the President 1969-70, supra
note 164, at 28.
217. Law School Annual Report to the President, 1966-67, supra note 143, at 20.
"A BULWARK AGAINST ANARCHY"Summer 2008]
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
over racial segregation. 218
Pre-Start began and ended before Bakke. As the next section
shows, however, reading current law on affirmative action through
the lens of Pre-Start can be instructive. A post-hoc strict-scrutiny
review of Pre-Start demonstrates that it would easily pass
constitutional muster, not only by the terms of the majority opinion
in Grutter, but even by the terms of Justice Thomas's dissent.
IV. Justifying Race-Based Affirmative Action
To some degree, the students staged their protest demonstrations
because they no longer felt that they were legitimate participants
in the democratic process. During the interviews students
frequently expressed mistrust and suspicion of all politicians, both
white and Negro, and their attitude seemed to be that, for the
most part, the legislative bodies at both the state and national
levels were simply institutions which had signs over their doors
reading 'whites only.' 219
The two key elements of race-based affirmative action policies
in Grutter and Gratz are a compelling state interest to justify any
such practice, and the narrow tailoring of the particular practice in
order to achieve the greatest possible benefit while ensuring the
smallest possible harm to non-beneficiaries. 220 Writing for the
majority in Gratz, Rehnquist accepted, apparently grudgingly, 221 the
holding of Grutter that diversity in the student body is a sufficiently
218. Interviews consistently confirm this claim. Nathaniel Gozansky asserts that
some Emory law professors probably opposed racial integration of the university, but
they recognized the inevitable and chose to remain silent. Interview with Nathaniel
Gozansky, law professor, Emory University, in Atlanta, Ga. (Nov. 11, 2006). Similarly,
Randolph Thrower, 1936 graduate of Emory Law School, served as President of the
Board of Visitors in 1961 and produced a report to the Board of Trustees on the topic of
racial integration. Letter from Henry Bowden, Board Chair, to Randolph Thrower, (May
3, 1961), thanking Thrower for sending the Report, and Report of Special Committee to
Review University Policy on Admissions [hereinafter Report of Special Committee], both box
1, Desegregation Documentation. Thrower now remembers little discussion of the
integration decision. Interview with Randolph Thrower, in Atlanta, Ga. (June 9, 2007).
That Thrower's lack of memories about integration has more to do with the lack of
controversy surrounding the decision than with any failure of memory on his part is
clear from his detailed recollections of, inter alia, his 1954 run for a seat in the U.S. House
of Representatives as a Republican. He reports that, after speaking as a candidate at
Morehouse College, he received threatening phone calls. Id.
219. Walker, Protest and Negotiation, supra note 184, at 35.
220. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
221. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites
the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
unprecedented in its deference.").
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compelling state interest to justify race-based affirmative action
policies by public universities. 222  Explaining the apparent
contradiction of voting with the majorities in two cases that came to
opposite conclusions, O'Connor stated that the undergraduate
program under review in Gratz failed the narrow-tailoring test, but
the law school program in Grutter passed that test.223
This section examines Pre-Start in light of the standards that the
Court articulated in Grutter and Gratz, and particularly in light of
Thomas's dissent in Grutter. Pre-Start, as Ben Johnson justified it at
the time, easily satisfies the requirement for a compelling state
interest. Indeed, it meets the state interest requirement that Justice
Thomas asserts in his Grutter dissent, which is significantly more
demanding than the requirement that the Grutter majority states.
The requirement for narrow tailoring is a bit more difficult, except
that the particular compelling state interest that Pre-Start advanced
renders unclear how one would even apply the test for narrow
tailoring. But, as we have seen, Johnson's account of the number of
African-American students he hoped to enroll consistently at Emory
Law School exemplifies the concept of "critical mass." 224
A. "A Bulwark Against Anarchy"
Justice Thomas's dissent in Grutter provides the most
demanding possible standard for justifying affirmative action, or
any other policy based on race. Having reviewed the Court's
decisions in this area with respect to the test of compelling state
interest as the only permissible basis for racial classifications,
Thomas wrote, "Where the Court has accepted only national
security, and rejected even the best interest of a child, as a
justification for racial discrimination, I conclude that only those
measures the State must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy,
or to prevent violence, will constitute a 'pressing public
necessity."' 2 2 5
222. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268.
223. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-41. But see Sander, supra note 12, at 405 (asserting that
based on his statistical analysis that the individualized review that O'Connor claimed to
find in the law school program, its saving grace, did not exist, or if it did exist, the
outcome would be no different than if the law school used the same method as the
undergraduate college).
224. Supra note 192 and accompanying text.
225. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would hold that a State's use of racial discrimination in
higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause."); Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 ("Neither of the parties has argued - nor
could they - that race-based student assignment is necessary to provide a bulwark
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The prevailing account for why Richard Nixon won the 1968
presidential election includes prominently the claim that many
Americans perceived the nation as flying apart at the seams at the
time, given growing protest against the Vietnam War, the general
indifference of hippies to prevailing social norms, and, perhaps
most importantly, the outbreak of race riots in various cities
beginning almost immediately after the signing of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act and continuing through the summer of 1968.226 It is not
an exaggeration to say that Ben Johnson's evangelical justification
for affirmative action at Emory Law School - the need to provide a
witness to African Americans for the proposition that the American
legal system really is just, and is so by dint, inter alia, of adequately
representing its constituents in all senses and at all points -
reflected his belief that lawyers in the late 19 60s had a unique
opportunity and responsibility to serve as a "bulwark against
anarchy." 2 2 7
To some extent, this should always be true of a legal system. In
John Locke's account, humans always have a responsibility to abide
by natural law, which prohibits harming another's life, liberty or
property. 228 Given that many humans will refuse to abide by
natural law, those who wish to enforce it cooperate to create systems
of positive law that provide greater protection to the participants. 229
The experience of the United States as a Lockean republic suggests
that the single greatest threat to this system is the wholesale refusal
to ensure equal protection of natural rights for entire groups.
Beginning with periodic outbreaks of violent resistance by slaves
and continuing through the Civil War, 230 the Ku Klux Klan,231
against anarchy or to prevent violence.").
226. See, e.g., JOAN HOFF, NIXON RECONSIDERED (Basic Books 1996) (arguing that
Nixon achieved a highly liberal, often overlooked, domestic agenda, more building on
than departing from the Johnson administration); WILLIAM C. BERMAN, AMERICA'S
RIGHT TURN: FROM NIXON TO BUSH 2, 8, passim (Johns Hopkins University Press 1992);
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING, passim (Regnery Publishing 1988)
(general theme that United States had lost its way as a nation during the 1960s);
WILLIAM A. RUSHER, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT 179-80 (W. Morrow 1984).
227. Johnson never used this phrase, but the activities he reported as dean of Emory
Law School - not just Pre-Start, but providing legal services to the poor as part of
training law students, faculty members' participation in civil rights efforts, etc. - reflect
his keen sense that lawyers had an active role to play in making American society more
just for all its members.
228. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 6 (1689) ("The state of
nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is
that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.").
229. Id. at §§ 88-89, 123.
230. SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE
CAROLINAS (Harvard University Press 2001) (including discussion of responses to slave
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lynching as a de facto policy tool throughout the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, 232 the Klan again,233 the various race riots
that whites inflicted on African Americans (Atlanta, 1906234;
Springfield, 1908235; East St. Louis, 1917236; Chicago, 1919237; Tulsa,
1921;238 Detroit, 1943239), the Klan again, and the bombings 240 and
rebellions by Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner); CHRISTOPHER
WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER: RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH,
1817-1880 (University of Illinois Press 1998) (local study based on trial court records
showing how race was frequently dividing line between whites' reliance on court
system and their resort to extralegal violence).
231. See, e.g., Edward John Harcourt, Who Were the Pale Faces? New Perspectives on the
Tennessee Ku Klux, 51 CIV. WAR HIST. 23 (2005) (new evidence of white supremacist
organization founded in Columbia, TN in 1868); Lewis Nicholas Wynne & Milly St.
Julien Vappie, The Camilla Race Riot and the Failure of Reconstruction in Georgia, 16 J. S.
GEO. HIST. 31 (2004) (connecting race riot in Camilla, GA in 1868 to Reconstruction
political conflict and the utility of Klan violence in restoring white supremacist rule);
Lou FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871-
1872 (University of Georia Press 1996) (presenting a narrow interpretation of federal
civil rights authority in trials anticipated subsequent narrowing by U.S. Supreme Court);
DAVID CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (Duke
University Press 1981).
232. LYNCHING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS (Christopher Waldrep, ed.,
2006); David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in
Twentieth-Century America, 39 LAW & SOC. REV. 793 (2005); MICHAEL J. PFEIFER, ROUGH
JUSTICE: LYNCHING AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1874-1947 (University of Illinois Press 2004)
(lynching as reflecting lower-class distrust of legal system, occurring nationally in this
period).
233. PAUL ORTIZ, EMANCIPATION BETRAYED: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF BLACK
ORGANIZING AND WHITE VIOLENCE IN FLORIDA FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE BLOODY
ELECTION OF 1920 (University of California Press 2005) (discussing that careful voter
registration drive in Fla., 1919-1920, unavailing as local, state, and federal authorities
permitted Klan violence against African-American voters); John M. Craig, "There is Hell
Going On Up There": The Carnegie Klan Riot of 1923, 72 PENN. HIST. 322 (2005) (telling of
riot, including one death and several injuries, that ensued in 1923 when Klan marched in
Pa. town without permit); GLENN FELDMAN, POLITICS, SOCIETY AND THE KLAN IN
ALABAMA, 1915-1949 (University of Alabama Press 1999) (documenting extralegal
violence of the Klan in this period). But see STEVE SUITTS, HUGO BLACK OF ALABAMA:
How HIS ROOTS AND EARLY CAREER SHAPED THE GREAT CHAMPION OF THE
CONSTITUTION (New South Books 2005) (exploring, inter alia, Klan involvement of
surprisingly liberal Supreme Court justice).
234. DAVID FORT GODSHALK, VEILED VISIONS: THE 1906 RACE RIOT AND THE
RESHAPING OF AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS (UNC Press 2005); GREGORY MIXON, THE
ATLANTA RIOT: RACE, CLASS, AND VIOLENCE IN A NEW SOUTH CITY (University Press of
Florida 2005).
235. ROBERTA SENECHAL, THE SOCIOGENESIS OF A RACE RIOT: SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS IN
1908 (University of Illinois Press 1990).
236. Malcolm McLaughlin, Reconsidering the East St. Louis Race Riot of 1917, 47 INT'L.
REV. SOC. HIST. 187 (2002).
237. WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR., RACE RIOT: CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919
(University of Illinois Press 1996) (1970).
238. ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921,
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murders 241 of civil rights activists and their supporters, nothing has
so frequently threatened a descent into anarchy in the United States
as white supremacy. White supremacists are disorderly, a chronic,
anarchic threat to the natural rights and positive law that the rest of
us - African American and otherwise - would peaceably enjoy. 242
Any number of means exist to contain the threat that white
supremacists pose, and the responsibility certainly should not fall
only on African Americans. Affirmative action in law schools, and
especially in southern law schools, is a patently logical policy -
mild in its reasonableness - in support of the compelling state
interest to prevent the anarchy that results when African Americans
face the choice of violently defending themselves against white
supremacists, or death. Clearly, the slaveholding states would
never have seceded from the Union to begin with had the slaves had
RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION (Oxford University Press 2002); JAMES S.
HIRSCH, RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE: THE TULSA RACE WAR AND ITS LEGACY (Houghton
Mifflin 2002).
239. Sharon E. McHaney, et al., Detroit's 1943 Riot, 77 MICH. HIST. 34 (1993); Dominic
J. Capeci, Jr., Black-Jewish Relations in War Time Detroit: The Marsh, Loving, Wolf Surveys
and the Race Riot of 1943, 47 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES 221 (1985).
240. CHARLES E. CONNERLY, "THE MOST SEGREGATED CITY IN AMERICA": CITY
PLANNING AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN BIRMINGHAM, 1920-1980 (University of Virginia Press
2005) (placing events such as bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in 1963 into
context of systematic white efforts to contain African Americans through use of zoning
laws); DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE CLIMACTIC
BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (Simon & Schuster 2001); Jack L. Walker, Sit-
Ins in Atlanta: A Study in the Negro Revolt, supra note 47, at 83.
241. GARY MAY, THE INFORMANT: THE FBI, THE Ku KLUX KLAN, AND THE MURDER OF
VIOLA LIUZZO (Yale University Press 2005) (presenting a study of murder of Viola
Liuzzo, housewife from Detroit whom Klansmen murdered in 1965 while she was
driving civil rights workers between Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, including role
of FBI and its informant, who may also have known about attacks on Freedom Riders in
1961 and bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham in 1963); John
Drabble, To Ensure Domestic Tranquility: The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE and
Political Discourse, 1964-1971, 38 J. AM. STUD. 297 (2004) (describing FBI efforts to
infiltrate and discredit Klan during 1960s); Glenn Feldman, Soft Opposition: Elite
Acquiescence and Klan-Sponsored Terrorism in Alabama, 1946-1950, 40 HIST. J. 753 (1997)
(explaining that elites were concerned about Klan violence mostly because it raised the
specter of federal intervention).
242. See Louisiana: Supremacist to Rally in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at A12; Chip
Berlet & Stanislav Vysotsky, Overview of U.S. White Supremacist Groups, 34 J. OF POL. &
MIL. SOC. 11 (2006); HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY (University of Massachusetts Press 1988). See also
Hunt, supra note 28, at 481 ("This Article finds common cause with that side of the
debate which holds, in short, that racism has not died either a quiet or ignominious
death. It argues, instead, that racism has merely traded in its old and crude weapons of
colonialism, slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and racial terrorism in exchange for more
subtle, and ultimately more effective, modern, sophisticated weaponry of metaphor,
rhetoric, language, image, denial, and most importantly - perspective.").
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effective political and legal representation in those states at the time
- that is, had the slaves not been slaves. 243 Johnson's primary goal
with Pre-Start was to increase the number of African-American
attorneys in the South - to increase, that is, the ability of African
Americans in formerly segregated states to defend themselves from
the depredations of white supremacy.
The other element in thc equal protection analysis as Justice
Thomas rehearses it is narrow tailoring. 244  Perhaps critics of
affirmative action in law school admissions know of some more
narrow way to combat the problem of roving potential violence by
white supremacists against African Americans. If so, they should
tell the rest of us what it is.
Training African Americans who may choose to become
prosecutors and/or judges, or increasing the likelihood that persons
of other races who ,.ill become prosecutors and/or judges have
some understanding of African Americans' experience, is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.245 It is also a solution
that nicely balances the legitimate expectations of African
Americans for enforcement of positive law to protect their natural
rights with the legitimate concern that more draconian measures to
contain the anarchic threat of white supremacy will result in harm to
other rights if only as the inevitable result of unlimited state power.
It is, in the most literal sense, the triumph of law over anarchy. It is
the creation of opportunities for legal self-defense by African
Americans against the lawlessness of white supremacy. If the courts
are open, then all African Americans need is the opportunity,
including the skills, to use them.246 Note that this argument does
243. Given the impressive ability of Confederate apologists to dominate the public
debate over the history of slavery and secession, see infra note 307 and accompanying
text, it seems well here to point out that all responsible historians agree: secession and
the American Civil War reflected the desire to preserve slavery. See Mark Voss-
Hubbard, The Infrapolitics of Slavery?, 32 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 41 (2004) (presenting review
of WILLIAM A. LINK, ROOTS OF SECESSION: SLAVERY AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM
VIRGINIA (UNC Press 2003) containing summary of recent titles on the topic), Roger L.
Ransom & Richard Sutch, Conflicting Visions: The American Civil War as a Revolutionary
Event, 20 RESEARCH ECON. HIST. 249 (2001) (reviewing significance of changing economy
at the North for precipitating political divergence between the sections).
244. Thomas himself actually spends effectively zero effort discussing the narrow-
tailoring prong because his insistence that the University of Michigan Law School has no
compelling state interest in considering race in the first place renders the issue of narrow
tailoring moot. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. See ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 186-89 (Oxford University Press 2007) (describing the enormous power
prosecutors wield, including call for systematic studies of racial bias in prosecutorial
decisions).
246. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 60, at 265-66, noting similarities at certain
points between Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Clarence Thomas, quoting Justice
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not depend on the assumption that all African Americans, or all
members of any other race, think or act alike. 247 It is, rather, highly
individualized 248 insofar as it allows those African Americans (and
others) who wish to combat white supremacy to do so by serving as
officers of a court. As officers of a court, African Americans and
others who oppose white supremacy may contribute to the
prosecution of white supremacists.
The reverse point is also true. Describing Atlanta in the late
nineteenth century, one historian has suggested that statutes
requiring racial segregation were virtually redundant because white
supremacy was already a deeply ingrained principle among police
officers, prosecutors, and judges.249 The result was what we might
call a common-law system of controlling African Americans. The
problem with the narrow-tailoring requirement here is that it is
impossible to determine in advance what number or percentage of
African Americans among a judiciary, in a prosecutor's office, or on
a police force - what critical mass - is sufficient to minimize the
racist use of facially non-racist substantive and procedural laws.250
Certainly the on-going problems of disproportionate minority
incarceration generally, 251 and repeated exonerations of African
Americans whom judges have sentenced to death, 2 2 suggest that
we have yet to solve the problem. This approach could provide a
more robust justification for the University of Michigan Law
School's desire to achieve a critical mass of racial and ethnic
minorities in its classes, which concept all of the dissenters roundly
criticized in Grutter.253
Marshall speaking at Dillard University in 1969 ("1 am a man of the law, and in my
book, anarchy is anarchy.").
247. See supra note 183.
248. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
249. Frith, supra note 44, at 21.
250. See DAVIS, supra note 245, at 5 ("Although I saw no evidence of intentional
discrimination based on race or class, the consideration of class- and race-neutral factors
in the prosecutorial process often produced disparate results along class and race
lines.").
251. See Derek Neal, How Families and Schools Shape the Achievement Gap, in
GENERATIONAL CHANGE: CLOSING THE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 127, at 26
(correlating poor educational performance with likelihood of unemployment and
imprisonment).
252. Recent titles on the issue of disproportionate minority prosecutions and
sentencing include Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location
on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161
(2006-2007); Michael Millemann & Gary W. Christopher, Preferring White Lives: The Racial
Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, AND
GENDER 1 (2005); Kevin McNally, Race and the Federal Death Penalty: A Nonexistent
Problem Gets Worse, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1615 (2003-2004).
253. See supra note 193.
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Dissenting in Grutter, Justices Scalia 254 and Kennedy 255 express
concern for the cultivation of resentment between the races that
affirmative action can produce. Justices Rehnquist 2 6 and Thomas257
lecture law school administrators, asserting that other methods exist
to achieve the goals that those administrators offer to justify their
affirmative action policies. Ben Johnson offers the example of a law
school administrator who could see racial resentment in action in his
own city, even in his own church,258 who risked personal and
professional reputation in order to bring about the racial integration
of the university where he taught. Johnson saw affirmative action in
law school admissions as part of the solution to the problem. Times
change. What worked from 1966 to 1972 may not work in 2007. But
Johnson's example is one that the rest of us should take seriously,
given his status as a relatively privileged 2 9 white southern man
whose direct experience as a law school dean led him to the
conclusion that affirmative action was necessary and beneficial.
B. "Diversity" v. Representation
Dissenting in Grutter, Justice Thomas was withering in his
denunciation of "diversity" in the student population as a
compelling state interest that could justify race-based affirmative
action by public universities. Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor characterized the educational benefits of diversity among
254. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 379-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "One must also consider the Law School's
refusal to entertain changes to its current admissions system that might produce the
same educational benefits. The Law School adamantly disclaims any race-neutral
alternative that would reduce 'academic selectivity,' which would in turn 'require the
Law School to become a very different institution, and to sacrifice a core part of its
educational mission.'... In other words, the Law School seeks to improve marginally the
education it offers without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status." Id. at
355. It is worth noting that two Justices who often represent themselves as champions of
judicial deference, Thomas and Scalia (see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(expressly joining Thomas's critique of the University of Michigan Law School's desire
to remain elite)), suddenly feel quite free to lecture not only university administrators,
but the Michigan legislature and, by implication, all of the state's residents. See id. at 360
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Law School's decision to be an elite institution does little
to advance the welfare of the people of Michigan or any cognizable interest of the State
of Michigan."). This sounds suspiciously like a policy decision.
258. See supra note 191.
259. Johnson's son, Ben F. Johnson III, explains that his father continued working for
the Georgia attorney general's office during his first years as a law professor at Emory
because his Emory salary was insufficient to support the family. Interview with Ben F.
Johnson III, in Atlanta, Ga. (Mar. 6, 2007).
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the student body as compelling and well supported by the
respondents. 260  Thomas replied to this claim, and the legal
implications of it, as follows.
The Law School believes both that the educational benefits of a
racially engineered student body are large and that adjusting its
overall admissions standards to achieve the same racial mix
would require it to sacrifice its elite status. If the Law School is
correct that the educational benefits of "diversity" are so great,
then achieving them by altering admissions standards should not
compromise its elite status. The Law School's reluctance to do
this suggests that the educational benefits it alleges are not
significant or do not exist at all. 261
Several authors agree with Thomas' argument that the alleged
educational benefits of student diversity are badly overblown. 262
Ben Johnson wrote to explain Pre-Start before the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs in Bakke.
But this fact makes his reasoning all the more compelling, especially
against the implication in the Grutter dissents that the University of
Michigan Law School's "critical mass" of diversity rationale was a
mere pretext.263 Johnson cannot have tailored his claims to
anticipate, or avoid, litigation under Bakke. More importantly,
Johnson's rationale for Pre-Start at Emory has direct support in the
text of the Constitution: the guarantee that every state shall have a
republican form of government. 264 A republic, as James Madison
explained in Federalist Number Ten, differs from a democracy only
260. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law
School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated
by respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is
no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.").
261. Id. at 356 n.4.
262. Brian N. Lizotte, Note: The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 625 (2006); Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger, Higher Education Must
Keep Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 161 (2004); Derrick
Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003). See also Sharon Elizabeth
Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER & LAW 43 (1997)
(exploring state's use of diversity as rationale for sex segregation in United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)). But see Matthew S. Lerner, Comment: Mhen Diversity
Leads to Adversity: The Principles of Promoting Diversity in Educational Institutions,
Premonitions of the Taxman v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1035 (1999)
(arguing that diversity is as valuable among teachers and administrators as among
students).
263. See supra note 117-120.
264. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.").
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in that the people choose representatives to make their decisions for
them, rather than trying to decide every public issue directly. We
should understand the term "representative" broadly here, to
include legislators, but also executive-branch officials and judges (at
least to the extent that we take seriously the definition of all three
types of official in the United States Constitution, which Madison
wrote to advocate the ratification of), prosecutors, 265 and even such
private representatives as attorneys. 266
Justice O'Connor at least gestured at this rationale in her Grutter
opinion.
[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634, 94 L. Ed. 1114, 70 S. Ct. 848
(1950) (describing law school as a "proving ground for legal
learning and practice"). Individuals with law degrees occupy
roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in
the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the
United States House of Representatives. See Brief for Association
of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae 5-6. The pattern is
even more striking when it comes to highly selective law schools.
A handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States
Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly
200 of the more than 600 United States District Court judges. Id. at
6.267
That is, not all "representatives," broadly defined, in our
culture have law degrees, but they are disproportionately likely to
do so.268
265. DAVIS, supra note 245.
266. See, e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007) (holding plaintiff not entitled to
recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 where judge issued preliminary
injunction allowing contested event to occur, but later found for defendant); Long v.
Bonnes, 455 U.S. 961 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, discussing
fee-shifting as Congressional method of encouraging enforcement of certain statutes
through use of private attorneys general); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (holding fee shifting available only where statute makes it so
expressly).
267. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. What O'Connor carefully failed to note is that, among
the Justices of the Court when she wrote, five attended Harvard Law School (Breyer,
Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter), one attended Yale Law School (Thomas), and two
attended Stanford Law School (O'Connor, Rehnquist). The ninth, Justice Stevens,
attended Northwestern. Clearly, for anyone who wishes to serve as a representative at
the pinnacle of the American legal system, attending a "highly selective" law school is
essential. It is puzzling that Justice Thomas also carefully avoided addressing this point
in his disquisition on the absence of a compelling state interest in maintaining an elite
law school. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 359-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
268. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("The interest of States
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That O'Connor subordinates this point to the argument on
behalf of "diversity" in education, rather than asserting it on its own
merits as a justification for race-based affirmative action in law
school admissions, is perverse, and an enormous missed
opportunity. That the lack of adequate representation, at least in
legislatures, has consistently been a key part of the problem for
African Americans in the United States is obvious from the various
efforts the nation has made to fix it: section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment; 269 the Fifteenth Amendment; 270 the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment; and 271 the 1965 Voting Rights Act.272 That we must
define "representation" broadly for these purposes is clear from the
provisions of the Voting Rights Act giving the Attorney General of
the United States a substantial role in enforcing it.273 Historical
in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of
the courts.'"). But see MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 60, at 247 (quoting Justice Thomas
speaking at James Madison University in 2001) ("The point that I'd like to stress here is
that the court is not a representative body. The court should be the least representative
body.... That doesn't mean you shouldn't have people from different groups there; I
think that's very important. But this is not a representative body. To the extent that it is,
then law isn't law. It's not a discipline. It's something that changes based on your
pigmentation.").
269. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state."). Note that
this amendment modifies, inter alia, the original denial of representation to slaves that
appears in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating the three-fifths compromise).
270. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.").
271. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President
or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax."). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-41 (1993) (presenting overview of
voting rights legislation and its purpose).
272. Pub. L. 89-110, Aug. 6, 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973 et seq., as amended.
273. 42 U.S.C. 1973a, 1973c(a). See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) (evaluating
role of federal courts in creating legislative districts where state government has failed to
secure statutory pre-clearance for changes). But see League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, at 629-30 ("Quite apart from the risk of acting without a
legislature's expertise, and quite apart from the difficulties a court faces in drawing a
map that is fair and rational ... the obligation placed upon the Federal Judiciary is
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experience demonstrates that the executive and judicial branches
must sometimes cooperate to ensure that segments of the
population do not suffer infringement of their right to
representation in the legislative branch.
Historian Hugh Graham notes one reason to justify affirmative
action in law school admissions in terms of the right to
representation in our Republic. Graham writes, "unlike the issues
generated by affirmative action in employment or higher education,
which have precipitated sharp disputes in election campaigns and
courtrooms, and on talk shows and college campuses, voting rights
policy has seemed immune from widespread public distemper." 274
The problem with affirmative action is that it looks like a zero-sum
game. Petitioners in DeFunis, Bakke, Hopwood, Smith, Gratz, and
Grutter275 all saw programs for increasing the admission of racial
and ethnic minorities as the cause but for which they would have
secured admission themselves. 276 Pre-Start necessarily displaced
some qualified white students in favor of African Americans. Policy
outcomes based on representation can sometimes seem like a zero-
sum game, but by definition, representation in our Republic cannot
be zero-sum.277 Everyone has a right to it.
Similarly, in many areas of American law we rely on the
concept of the private attorney general, reflecting the potential for
unwelcome because drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the most
significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican self-
governance. That Congress is the federal body explicitly given constitutional power
over elections is also a noteworthy statement of preference for the democratic process.
As the Constitution vests redistricting responsibilities foremost in the legislatures of the
States and in Congress, a lawful, legislatively enacted plan should be preferable to one
drawn by the courts.").
274. Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 177
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davis, eds. 1992).
275. See supra, note 57 for citations to cases.
276. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISsIONS 36
(Princeton University Press 1998) (explaining why, mathematically, elimination of
affirmative action would have minimal effect on the admissions chances of any given
white applicant). But see Swain, et al., supra note 28, at 149 (noting that the public still
disapproves of racial preferences in university admissions). The mathematical logic of
Bowen and Bok likely does not apply, at least not with the same force, to law school
admissions simply because the numbers are much smaller. See also, Joseph Berger, The
Man Behind the V., N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2003, at sec. 4A, p.23 (presenting an interview
with Lee Bollinger, lead defendant in Grutter and Gratz as President of the University of
Michigan, asserting of the undergraduate program that it awarded points for so many
different characteristics that singling out race as the cause of any student's rejection is
tendentious).
277. But see Branch, 538 U.S. at 258 (involving Miss. legislature's failure to redistrict
the state after 2000 census resulted in loss of one seat in the House of Representatives).
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overlap between private and public representatives, especially for
persons who have suffered denial of their civil rights. 278  The
potential significance of making legal representation available for
civil rights challenges is clear from the efforts of some state
governments to stop it.279 It is the case neither that only African
Americans can effectively represent other African Americans, nor
that all African Americans who hold law degrees choose to
represent other African Americans. But compelling state interest
does not require such precision. The historical evidence clearly
demonstrates that African Americans are much more likely than
anyone else to take on the tasks of providing effective representation
to other African Americans. 280
The career of Thurgood Marshall is only the most famous
example of a lawyer who started out as a private attorney general of
sorts, during his work for the NAACP, and later became a very
public defender of civil rights during his tenure as a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.281 Narrowly tailoring an affirmative
action program to produce the next Thurgood Marshall is
impossible. Sander's critique of affirmative action, by contrast,
succeeds against this argument for the benefit to African Americans
of having more attorneys available to represent them only to the
extent that he is willing to argue that the alleged reduction in the
number of African-American attorneys that he claims as the result of
current policies would actually preclude the training of the next
Thurgood Marshall.
One could offer Marshall himself as proof that affirmative
action is unnecessary. Certainly no such program existed when he
278. See supra, note 247. See also, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281-84 (discussing whether private
right of action exists in Title VI, as it does in other titles, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
279. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (state's attempt to punish attorney for
barratry because she sent a letter offering free legal representation to woman sterilized
as condition of receiving medical attention violated first and fourteenth amendments);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (state regulation designed to prohibit offers of
legal assistance violated petitioner's first amendment rights).
280. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (University of North Carolina Press 2005) (1987). See also, Brett
Gadsden, "He Said He Wouldn't Help Me Get a Jim Crow Bus": The Shifting Terms of the
Challenge to Segregated Public Education, 1950-1954, 90 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 9 (2005)
(presenting an examination of differing, sometimes conflicting, priorities between
potential African-American plaintiffs in civil rights suits and the attorneys who set the
agenda for the movement in part by deciding what suits to file). But see, MICHAEL
MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (University of Virginia Press 2006)
(presenting a memoir of a "white civil rights lawyer").
281. TUSHNET, supra note 280; JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY (Three Rivers Press 1998); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991
(Oxford University Press 1997).
[Vol. 5
applied to law schools. But the history of enforcement that followed
Brown v. Board of Education demonstrates that the big, famous
victories set the stage for many smaller, less famous battles. 28 2
Adequate representation for African Americans requires attorneys
who will fight those battles. Further, insofar as the point of
adequate representation for African Americans is to enable them to
enjoy the benefits of American life that others take for granted, they
need attorneys who can provide them with estate plans and real
estate contracts, adoptions and divorces, and every other type of
legal service. Again, this argument does not depend on a one-to-one
correlation between African-American attorneys and African-
American clients. It depends only on the proposition that African-
American attorneys are significantly more likely to have African-
American clients.
Or one could return to the example of Marvin Arrington, whose
career has included representing clients as an attorney,
representation in the legislative branch of Atlanta municipal
government, and now service as a county judge.2 3 Post hoc, the
individualized consideration that O'Connor so prized might also
mean that, although the law school should have some basis for
predicting that a given student will succeed in law school, it may
have little or no way of predicting what "success" will mean for
students after they graduate. Paul Peterson, a scholar of education
at Harvard, argues for the importance of role models, especially for
adolescents. 284 He contrasts an earlier period when prominent
African Americans included well educated, hard-working persons
such as Marshall and Martin Luther King, Jr., with a later period
when the most famous African Americans were sports and rap stars
as part of his explanation for the declining performance of African-
American high school students during the 1990s. 28 5 They did not all
participate in Pre-Start, but African-American graduates of Emory
282. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding federal
district courts are proper entities to decide individual remedies reflecting broad
principle that racial segregation in public education violates U.S. Constitution). See also,
Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, NY TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24.
(reporting conflicting opinions among Justices and among observers over the
relationship between the recent decision involving the Seattle and Louisville schools and
Brown).
283. Arrington asserts emphatically that he is not a "'civil rights lawyer." His private
practice focused on representing corporations. See Nwakuche interview, supra note 1.
He might, however, prove to be exactly the sort of "sympathetically effective" judge
whom Patricia Williams sees the occupants of the courthouse hallways as looking for.
Williams, supra note 182, at 403.
284. Peterson, supra note 127, at 16. See also, Wilkins, supra note 12.
285. Wilkins, supra note 12.
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Law School include business leader Felker Ward, 28 6 Georgia
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears, 287 Georgia Attorney
General Thurbert Baker,288 and Federal District Judge Clarence
Cooper, 289 in addition to Judge Arrington. Pre-Start is just one
indication of Emory Law School's efforts to increase the number of
African-American attorneys who, in addition to their professional
work, contribute to the larger community by serving as role models.
C. Remedying Past Discrimination
In announcing its decision to seek the demise of the state statute
requiring racial segregation as a condition for state tax exemption,
Emory administrators asserted that the university had never had a
formal policy of selecting students on the basis of race. 290 The
implication was that the state statute was the only reason for its
refusal to admit African Americans. Ironically, this assertion might
seem to defeat any claim by Emory that it would use affirmative
action to compensate for past discrimination. The Court has
recently reiterated that "'proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required' to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." 29 1
Of course, there is something legalistic, 292  not to say
disingenuous, about the assertion that Emory never had an official
286. Tuskegee University, Businessman Makes Grand Appearance as Parade Marshal,
http://www.tuskegee.edu/Global/story.asp?S=4086118 (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
287. Supreme Court of Georgia, Justices Biographies, http://www.gasupreme.us/justices-
bios.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
288. Office of Attorney General of Georgia, Thurbert E. Baker, http://www.state.ga.us/
ago/biography.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
289. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/
public/home.nsf/hisj (click "C", follow "Clarence Cooper" hyperlink) (last visited Apr.
12, 2008).
290. Randolph Thrower, Report of Special Committee to Review University Policy on
Admissions, May 3, 1961, in box 1, Desegregation Documentation, EUA.
291. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Fdn., 538 U.S. 188, 194
(2003) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) &
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
292. This claim was actually part of Emory's legal strategy. See Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunction, Emory v. Nash, (Superior Court, DeKalb County,
Georgia, May 1962), Desegregation Documentation. The statute in question granted a
tax exemption to all private educational institutions with the proviso that funds at
institutions "for white people" could only be used for white people, and vice versa. GA.
CONST. Const. art. VII, § 1, IV; GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5404. Emory's observation that
nothing in its founding or other documents identified it as "for white people" was part
of the claim that the segregation proviso literally did not apply to Emory because the
institution did not meet the proviso's condition. Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Injunction, supra at 9.
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policy of selecting students on the basis of race. Its administrators
responded more constructively than most to the demand for
integration, and their actions in the 1960s reflected a long tradition
of raising serious questions about the wisdom of segregation. 293 But
Goodrich White was no supporter of integration during his stint as
President of Emory. Examining Emory's history of racial
segregation only throws more doubt on the legal - not to say
legalistic - framework for analyzing discrimination claims since
Washington v. Davis.294 The intent requirement is as badly misplaced
in evaluating discrimination by educational institutions as it is in
evaluating discrimination by employers. 295
The concern to limit affirmative action programs to entities that
have discriminated in the past seems to stem from the Court's desire
to cabin such programs in a way that is consistent with the theory of
individual responsibility that underlies much of the Court's
thinking, and apparently many Americans' thinking as well. 296
Powell originally criticized the idea of remedying "societal"
discrimination because it threatened to inflict harm on individuals,
such as Bakke himself, who bore no particular responsibility for the
discrimination. 297 O'Connor endorsed this proposition with her
summary in Grutter of Powell's Bakke opinion.298
D. Individualized Consideration
In Gratz, Justice Rehnquist makes much of the claim that
293. See, e.g., Andrew Sledd, The Negro: Another View, 90 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 65
(1902); Henry Y. Warnock, Andrew Sledd, Southern Methodists, and the Negro: A Case
History, 31 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 251 (1965). See also, Terry L. Matthews, The Voice of a
Prophet: Andrew Sledd Revisited, 6 J. SOUTHERN RELIGION 2 (2003). Sledd was a professor
of Latin at Emory when he published his Atlantic Monthly article accepting white
supremacy, but condemning the practice of lynching and generally calling for better
treatment of African Americans. The College (as it was then) fired him as a result of
public outcry. See also, ATTICUS GREENE HAYGOOD, OUR BROTHER IN BLACK (Phillips &
Hunt 1881); Allison 0. Adams, Where "The New South" Was Born, EMORY MAG., Summer
1998, (explaining Emory President Haygood's use of the term, "The New South" to
indicate increased emphasis on economic production and improved race relations before
Henry Grady, editor of ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, gained fame for using it), available at
http://www.emory.edu/EMORY MAGAZINE/ summer98/enigma.html.
294. Davis, 426 U.S. at 229 (holding discriminatory intent necessary to find violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
295. Krieger, supra note 51.
296. See WILLIAM HALTOM AND MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (University of Chicago Press 2004) (presenting an
excellent discussion of how popular ideas about responsibility influence perceptions of
the alleged "litigation crisis," focusing on tort law).
297. But see Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, supra note 67.
298. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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undergraduates in the Michigan system did not receive
individualized consideration because that system automatically
added twenty points to the score of any "underrepresented
minority." 299 Similarly, Justice Roberts emphasized individualized
consideration in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1.300 Again, this was the issue that led Justice
O'Connor to vote for upholding the law school's program in Grutter,
but for striking down the undergraduate program in Gratz.
Pre-Start again provides an interesting comparison. Pre-Start
students took law classes that were as ordinary as the circumstances
allowed. Although in some respects the instruction was more
individualized than usual, the more important point is that it was
the closest possible facsimile of what the students would have to do
in order to succeed in law school. This is narrow tailoring in the
best sense. Further, Johnson asked the pre-law advisors at the
sending institutions to choose the participants. No evaluation could
be more individualized. Such a system also allows for the receiving
institution to choose which sending institutions to recruit from. Is it
racial discrimination for Emory to focus recruitment efforts on
Morris Brown or Talledega Colleges? Certainly the existence of
HBCUs is the result of segregation. Can recruiting at HBCUs then
be an example of remedying past discrimination?
O'Connor's position allows, if it does not require, the inference
that individualized consideration increases the legitimacy of race-
based affirmative action because it achieves a greater
correspondence between the goal of the program and the history of
the individual. If the institution is really trying to achieve diversity
or give opportunities to persons who otherwise would not have
them, then admissions officials need to look carefully at individual
applications. Pre-Start demonstrates that the most individualized
consideration is consistent with a policy of recruiting only African
Americans, at least so long as historically black colleges exist to
recruit from and remain overwhelmingly African American in their
student bodies.
E. Harm to African-American Students
In an important sense, none of these arguments addresses
Sander's main claim: that affirmative action does more harm than
good to its supposed beneficiaries. We are in the process of asking
299. Gratz, 538 U.S. at 271-73.
300. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2763 ("The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was
that the admissions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual,
and not simply as a member of a particular racial group.").
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Emory Law School's African-American graduates if they agree. 301
In the meantime, one of the great virtues of historical research for
policy debates is that it can allow us to discern how much past
policies achieved their goals, and how much the terms of the debate
have changed, or not changed, since. In the present instance, it is
striking, and disheartening, to see the extent to which Sander's
argument echoes the arguments of fifty years ago about racial
integration. I should note here emphatically that this is not a claim
about Sander's personal attitudes toward the issue. The point is not
to suggest that Sander harbors segregationist impulses. The point is
a more structural one about how particular types of argument
continue to assert themselves even as the specific terms of their
articulation change with the times.
One of Sander's key claims is that affirmative action harms
African-American law students because of "mismatch." 302
According to this theory, by gaining admission to significantly
better law schools than they otherwise would because of boosts to
their admissions scores, African Americans find themselves unable
to keep up with the other, better qualified students in their
classes.303 The result is that they perform poorly as law students,
thereby harming their prospects on the bar exam.304
Compare this theory to historian Melissa Kean's account of
what Vanderbilt University Chancellor Harvie Branscomb thought
about segregation.
Branscomb specifically rejected the mixing of black and white
children in the public schools on the ground that most blacks had
capabilities so much lower than even poor whites that it simply
made no sense. 'Opportunities,' he wrote, 'must be given in some
sort of relationship to capacities to use them and the mixing of
populations must be on some general levels of approximately
equal and similar social backgrounds and mores.' 30 5
The implication of Branscomb's statement seems to be that class
mobility, to say nothing of racial integration, or even the admission
of women, is essentially impossible, since one must only educate
like with like.
301. This article is only part of a larger research project that includes interviewing the
first generation of African-American graduates of Emory Law School. As part of the
interviews, I summarize Sander's argument and ask the interviewees what they think
about it.
302. Sander, supra note 12, at 450-54.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Kean, supra note 22, at 20.
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More importantly, the congruence between Branscomb's
position on segregation and the mismatch theory of affirmative
action is unmistakable and horrifying. Again, the point is not to
suggest that anyone who opposes affirmative action thereby also
supports segregation. The point is that any discussion of affirmative
action must proceed with the history of segregation, and race
relations generally, well in mind in order to avoid perpetuating the
injustice of the past. According to Branscomb, "We have had two
patterns of dealing with Negroes in the South. The first was the
slavery pattern, the second the one which grew up under the
unrealistic idealism and sheer cynicism of the carpetbagger
governments." 306  While the victors proverbially write most
histories, in the American South, the losers' story of the past has
prevailed. With this statement, Branscomb accepted uncritically the
widespread, wildly inaccurate but highly influential account of
Reconstruction according to which northerners who simply did not
understand the former slaves tried to rush political and social
change in ways that did more harm than good. 30 7
Branscomb's reference to carpetbagger governments resonates
with the various conservative denunciations, especially those by
Justices Thomas and Scalia, of efforts to remedy the ongoing effects
of slavery and segregation. No modern Supreme Court justice uses
the term "carpetbagger," not least because the issue is no longer so
geographically defined. But the logic is essentially the same.
According to this logic, overly idealistic efforts to push African
Americans ahead before they are ready do disservice to the African
Americans themselves because they lack the necessary skills to
306. Id. at 21.
307. See, e.g., W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, THE SOUTHERN PAST: A CLASH OF RACE AND
MEMORY (Harvard University Press 2005) (examining content of and methods for
producing competing Black and White versions of southern history, and therefore of
southern identity); JAMES C. COBB, AWAY DOWN SOUTH: A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN
IDENTITY (Oxford University Press 2005). See also, ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE
STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (Knopf 2005) (presenting a recent
synthesis by current leading scholar of Reconstruction); ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS: A
SOUTHERN HISTORIAN AND HIS CRITICS (John David Smith and John C. Inscoe, eds.,
1990) (presenting a study of historian whose work in early twentieth century helped
cement white-supremacist view of Reconstruction); Peter Kolchin, Race, Slavery, and
History, 18 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 466, 471 (1990) (presenting an overview of developments
in history of slavery and African Americans) ("Although most historians have, since the
1950s, rejected the once-dominant racist interpretations of slavery and Reconstruction,
their views have only very partially breached the walls of academe to penetrate society
at large. Particularly with respect to Reconstruction, students still routinely bring to
college belief in a watered-down version of almost all the old shibboleths of the 'tragic
era' - evidently absorbed practically by osmosis at home and school - from the
humiliation of the already suffering South by hateful carpetbaggers to the restoration of
'home rule.'").
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succeed, and they invite white backlash. This was the position that
Goodrich White, President of Emory from 1942 to 1957, also took in
arguing for increased education for African Americans, but only in
segregated institutions. 308
It is interesting and instructive to note the apparent parallel
between the attitudes of white southerners such as Branscomb and
White, on one hand, and modern law school administrators on the
other. Thomas begins his Grutter dissent with a quotation from
Frederick Douglass the primary point of which is that African
Americans would be much better off if white people just left them
alone, instead of trying to "help." 3 9 Sander accuses law school
administrators of hiding their admission practices, perhaps even
engaging in deception, in order to reconcile their devotion to
affirmative action with the rules of Bakke. 310 On this view, efforts by
white university officials to direct the educational uplift of African
Americans are no more acceptable today than they were in the
middle of the twentieth century.
One obvious and important difference is that African
Americans play a much larger role in this debate in the early
twenty-first century than they did in the mid twentieth century, not
least because they have much greater access to the institutions in
question, and concomitantly occupy many more prominent
positions from which to address the issue.311  Not all African
Americans support affirmative action.312 Thomas is not alone in
denouncing the practice. But, as Orlando Patterson asserted in
reviewing a biography of Thomas, "he is arguably one of the most
308. Kean, supra note 22, at 37-38.
309. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see MERIDA & FLETCHER,
supra note 60, at 278 (giving the parts of the quotation that Thomas omitted, suggesting
that those parts significantly change the meaning from Thomas's version).
310. Sander, supra note 12, at 372 ("I try to make clear how Bakke, while legitimating
affirmative action, created distinctions that produced a code of silence among law
schools about their racial preference programs, and deterred meaningful research."). See
also, Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 n.22 (Rehnquist responding to Ginsburg's dissenting
observation, id. at 304, that universities will continue to find ways to achieve diversity in
their student bodies regardless of what the Supreme Court decides).
311. But see, LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE AND SING: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS
SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 18 (Simon & Schuster 1998) ("These are
people whose voices are too often missing from public debate about issues on which
they are expert. Their voices are missing not because they don't want to speak but
because they don't get a hearing.") I have no desire to dispute Guinier's observation
that many potential experts fail to get a hearing in contemporary legal and political
debates because of their race and/or class. My point is more that a large and growing
body of scholarship now strives to remind us of this problem more frequently (and more
effectively?) than at any time in the history of the Republic.
312. See, e.g., Ward Connerly, U.C. Must End Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRONICLE, May
3, 1995, reprinted in Crosby & VanDeVeer, supra note 28, at 29-31.
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viscerally despised people in black America. It is incontestable that
he has benefited from affirmative action at critical moments in his
life, yet he denounces the policy and has persuaded himself that it
played little part in his success." 313 The great virtue of statistical
analysis, like any form of abstraction, is that it can allow us to see
patterns that we would otherwise miss. It is by no means
impossible that Thomas has been right about affirmative action all
along, and that Sander's study only provides the empirical proof
that we had hitherto lacked. It is not racist to suggest that African
Americans' and others' widespread support for affirmative action
has been misplaced for want of sufficient data.
But historical research can play a similar role, and it is not
difficult to compile historical evidence for the point that scholars in
the United States have a long tradition of using "objective" research
methods in the service of racism, whether deliberately or not. The
significance of statistical data depends on one's frame of reference,
and the historical data suggests that Justice Thomas, Sander, and
others continue to interpret their data in light of the popular but
erroneous tale of foolish carpetbaggers cynically claiming to help
African Americans but actually doing harm.
Judson Ward was a Vice President of Emory during the late
1950s and 1960s.314 One of his responsibilities in this period was to
coordinate planning for Emory's response should the Georgia
legislature follow through on its threat to close down all public
schools in the state rather than comply with Brown v. Board of
Education.315 During that time, Ward received a flyer, addressed
" [t]o the Emory faculty," publicizing the views of the Federation for
Constitutional Government. 316 It contained racist screed that was
quite typical for the day. The argument was that "racial
amalgamation" would "end in the destruction of the Caucasian
civilization in this country" and "of this Republic as a sovereign
nation." 317 Two of the four pages in this flyer consist of references
to seventeen studies that purportedly demonstrated the intellectual
inferiority of African Americans. 318
313. Orlando Patterson, Thomas Agonistes, review of KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A.
FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2007), N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/books/review/
Patterson-html?_r=l&st=cse&sq = %22Book+REview%22+ %22Thomas+Agonistes%22&
scp=l&oref=slogin.
314. Biographical note, Ward papers, EUA.
315. Interview with Judson C. Ward, former Vice President of Emory University,
Atlanta, GA (Dec. 12, 2006).
316. The Effect of Negro Mental Inferiority and Racial Integration Upon Caucasian




Again, it is not necessary to characterize current critics of
affirmative action as racists in order to appreciate the similarity
between the arguments in favor of segregation in the 1950s and
1960s and the arguments against affirmative action today. We
should not allow cheap accusations of racism to hinder full and
frank debate. Neither, however, should we allow excess confidence
that we have transcended our racist past to blind us to the striking
congruence between the logic of then and the logic of now.
Social scientists often write as if their data provides a degree of
certainty that would be impossible otherwise. Sander does so. John
P. Jackson, Jr., has demonstrated vividly the problem with claims of
scientific objectivity in the context of debates about law and public
policy. He has written two books, one about the social scientists
who supported Brown v. Board of Education,31 9 and one about the
social scientists who opposed it.320 The point is not that social
scientific research contributes nothing useful to law and policy
debates. The point is that we should be wary of the hope that social
scientific data - or anything else - will serve as a deus ex machina
that can resolve difficult issues for us.
Again, Ben Johnson provides a helpful example. He began
teaching at Emory while Goodrich C. White was still President of
the University, and while Harvie Branscomb was still Chancellor of
Vanderbilt. It is ultimately impossible to explain fully why Johnson
rejected White's and Branscomb's understanding of racial
integration in education, but he did so. The path from 1962 to 2007
was decidedly bumpy in many ways, and a number of authors have
asserted that we have yet to accomplish enough by way of ensuring
equality for African Americans, 321 but the available evidence does
not demonstrate that Ben Johnson was wrong to take the risk of
offering African-American students the possibility of legal
education at a historically white university, or that the students
were wrong to pursue the option.
319. JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SOCIAL SCIENTISTS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: MAKING THE CASE
AGAINST SEGREGATION (NYU Press 2001).
320. JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SCIENCE FOR SEGREGATION: RACE, LAW, AND THE CASE
AGAINST BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (NYU Press 2005).
321. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The stain of generations of
racial oppression is still visible in our society, and the determination to hasten its
removal remains vital.") (citation omitted).
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V. The LSAT and Legal Education
One of the key issues in the debate over race-based affirmative
action in American law schools is the use of the Law School
Admission Test ("LSAT") as a major factor in choosing which
students to admit. According to Justice Thomas:
[N]o modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor
performance of blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law schools continue to
use the test and then attempt to 'correct' for black
underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so
as to obtain their aesthetic student body. The Law School's
continued adherence to measures it knows produce racially
skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court.322
This statement cuts both ways with respect to Pre-Start. On the
one hand, Johnson was clearly guilty - he touted the rising LSAT
scores of the Emory Law School student body as a whole to indicate
the rising quality of the school.323
On the other hand, instead of simply accepting lower LSAT
scores (or, as Sander claims, applying a point boost to all racial
minority applicants), 324 Johnson decided to eliminate the LSAT as a
factor in the admission of African Americans altogether. Given
Thomas' implication that law school administrators are almost
entirely cynical in their use of race-based affirmative action,
Johnson's historical example becomes all the more relevant. With
Pre-Start, Johnson demonstrated why law schools rely so heavily on
the LSAT: Any reasonable substitute is hugely expensive.325
Johnson found external grant funds for Pre-Start, and the program
ended when the funds ran out.326
What Thomas's Grutter dissent completely fails to take into
account is the problem of institutional resource allocation. He is
322. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also, Brown-Nagin, supra
note 4.
323. See, e.g., Law School Annual Report to the President, 1963-64, at 11-12, EUA; Law
School Annual Report to the President, 1965-66, at 20-21, EUA.
324. Sander, supra note 12, at 399-405.
325. In 1992, Congress appropriated $7 million to support the Council for Legal
Educational Opportunity. This is a national program, and it includes components that
Pre-Start did not, but it indicates what a comparable program costs. See Conference
Report, Higher Education Amendments of 1992, H.R. REP. No. 102-630, at 332 (1992).
326. Sibley letter, supra note 142.
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simply wrong to assert that the University of Michigan Law School
could achieve the racial diversity it desires among its student body
by lowering admissions standards. 327 Its administrators, if they are
rational, planned the current facilities with a certain size of student
population in mind. The lowering of admissions standards that
Thomas recommends would presumably overwhelm those facilities
with a much larger population.328 He also fails to appreciate the
extent to which managing a large institution often involves striving
to balance competing demands. Michigan Law School
administrators wish to maintain the academic quality of their
institution, and they see admitting a critical mass of racial and
ethnic minority students as part of achieving that goal. Here
Thomas inadvertently demonstrates the favorite point of judicial
conservatives: judges often lack the specific expertise necessary to
evaluate policy decisions. 329
A. The LSAT is Bad for African Americans
Thomas may be exactly right, however, in suggesting that
heavy reliance on the LSAT in law school admissions is bad for
African Americans. John Nussbaumer studied a set of law schools
in California that were undergoing intensive accreditation review by
the American Bar Association. 330 He found that such schools
typically increased the twenty-fifth percentile LSAT scores of their
students during this process, and typically decreased significantly
the number of African-American students they enrolled.331 This is
not a claim about intent. This is a claim about how otherwise
rational decisions affect African Americans in a society that is far
from eliminating the lingering effects of slavery and segregation.
Nussbaumer's claim is similar to that of Jay Rosner, Executive
Director of the Princeton Review Foundation. 332 He asserts that the
Educational Testing Service ("ETS"), which creates the Scholastic
327. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350, 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also, id. at 346 (Scalia
joining in Thomas' dissent).
328. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-13 ("[The Law School] receives more than 3,500
applications each year for a class of around 350 students.").
329. See, e.g., LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594. See also, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that as a member of this Court I am not
empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situated. My duty, rather, is to
'decide cases 'agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States."") (citation
omitted).
330. Nussbaumer, supra note 49.
331. Id. at 993.
332. Jeffrey R. Young, Researchers Charge Racial Bias on the SAT, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 10, 2003, at A34.
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Aptitude Test ("SAT"), tracks performance by race and ethnicity on
potential test questions during an evaluation phase. 333 In doing so,
they find that whites consistently do better on some questions, while
African Americans and Hispanics consistently do better on others. 334
In choosing which questions to include in actual tests, however, ETS
relies solely on the percentage of test takers who get the answer
right, without considering race or ethnicity. 335 The problem is that,
as a simple function of the numbers, the statistical evaluation of
questions results in systematically discarding questions that racial
and ethnic minority test-takers do well on while retaining questions
that white test-takers do well on. 336
This point illustrates the larger problem with Sander's claim: he
carefully avoids any consideration of the larger literature, not just
on the LSAT, but on standardized tests generally. Writing in 1993,
psychologist Janet E. Helms noted that the historical phenomenon of
African-American students attending anything other than
historically black institutions in large numbers was so recent that
comparative research on educational performance was still
"exploratory." 337 The situation must have changed somewhat after
ten to twelve years have passed, but the level of certainty that
Sander expresses on the topic still seems misplaced.
Sander asserts that the combination of undergraduate GPA
("UGPA") and LSAT explains 35 percent of an individual student's
outcome on a bar exam.338 He explains that, while this number itself
may seem unimpressive, it is far larger than any of the other
variables he has studied. 339 That is, UGPA combined with LSAT
correlates significantly higher with bar passage rates than any other
factors. 340  An important premise underlying all of Sander's
argument is that we live in an imperfect world where we have to
make do with what we have, and the combination of UGPA and
LSAT score, whatever its flaws, is better than any other option for
choosing whom to admit to law schools.
Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips demonstrate the flaw





337. Janet E. Helms, Black or Mhite Colleges: Which Path Leads to Acadeiic Survival?, 38
CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY: APA REVIEW OF BOOKS 510 (1993) (presenting review of
WALTER R. ALLEN, ET AL., COLLEGE IN BLACK AND WHITE: AFRICAN AMERICAN
STUDENTS IN PREDOMINANTLY WHITE AND HISTORICALLY BLACK PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
(1991)).




to The Black-White Test Score Gap.34 1  They note that African
Americans' actual job performance tends to vary from that of whites
by about two-fifths of a standard deviation, which is significantly
less than the racial variation in performance on employment tests.342
The reason for the difference between the racial variation in test
scores and in actual job performance is that "test scores explain only
about 10 to 20 percent of the variation in job performance." 343 They
then illustrate the dramatic impact that can result from choices
about how to select employees.
Imagine a company that has 600 applicants for 100 openings. Half
the applicants are black and half are white. If the firm hires all
applicants as temporary workers and retains those who perform
best on the job, and if the performance gap between blacks and
whites averages 0.4 standard deviations, about 36 blacks will get
permanent jobs. If the firm selects the 100 applicants with the
highest scores, about 13 blacks will get permanent jobs. 344
Manifestly, Pre-Start did not admit every African American
who might want to go to Emory Law School.
But Pre-Start did do what Jencks and Phillips here describe in a
broader sense: it eliminated the test that administrators knew
African Americans fared poorly on in favor of "temporary
employment" to see how well African-American prospects fared in
actual law school classes, or a close facsimile of actual law school
classes. By Sander's own account, if UGPA and LSAT explain 35
percent of law students' bar exam performance, that leaves 65
341. Jencks & Phillips, supra note 16, at 14-15.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 15.
344. Id. See also, Daniel Koresh, Using Multiple Measures to Address Perverse Incentives
and Score Inflation, 22 EDUC. MEASUREMENT 18, 19 (2003) ("Unless the cut score is set
extremely low or high, even highly reliable tests will result in considerable decision
inconsistency. Even a test with a reliability of .9 will result in inconsistent decisions for
12 percent or more of students if the cut score is placed so as to pass anywhere between
30 percent and 70 percent of test takers."). This is a different point, but equally
important -regardless of how many persons of a particular type gain admission using a
given test, a different test might lead to the admission of the same number of persons,
but not the same individuals. It would seem that law schools avoid this question insofar
as they only use one test, but the variation that Koresh identifies among tests should
make us wary of accepting uncritically any claim that the LSAT well measures the
aptitude that law students need to have if only because we have nothing to compare the
LSAT to. See Daniel M. Koretz, Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of
Educators' Productivity, 37 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 752, 756 (2002) (tests that correlate 0.8,
with cut-score set at mean for both tests, would still produce difference of half a
standard deviation or more between scores on different tests by 40% of students). See
also, William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising
and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975 (2004).
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percent unexplained. Granting that some, perhaps much, of that 65
percent must be factors that law schools will never have much
ability to measure or to influence, still it seems obvious that law
school faculty and administrators (indeed, all faculty and
administrators) would want to know as much as they can about the
factors that conduce to success among their students in order to take
whatever reasonable steps they can to increase that success. Pre-
Start was a flawed experiment, not least because of the small
number of individuals who participated, but it is certainly not
devoid of probative value for this purpose.
What this point illustrates is the extent to which the problem is
one of disparate impact 345  - that otherwise rational, non-
prejudicial, facially non-racial practices continue to have a disparate
impact on racial and ethnic minorities, especially Hispanics and
African Americans. To insist in the face of such evidence that
legislators and judges cannot distinguish benign from invidious
uses of racial classifications seems itself to reflect a purely aesthetic
position 346 - the Constitution as ideal, the keepers of which must
prevent it from becoming sullied by association with real-world
policy solutions.
B. The Role of the Professor in Law School
But there is a larger question here as well: what do law
professors believe themselves to accomplish with their teaching, and
how well do their methods serve their ends? 347 One key, largely
unexamined, problem with Sander's analysis is that his is an entirely
closed system. He offers a "systemic" analysis in the sense of
explaining how no individual law school can easily break from the
345. See Azel P. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (holding disparate-
impact claims available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
just as they are under Title VII). The Azel Smith Court expressly couched the issue as
whether the reasoning of the original disparate impact case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), applied to age discrimination under the ADEA. 544 U.S. at 230. But see
Michael Boucai, Caught in a Web of Ignorances: How Black Americans are Denied Equal
Protection of the Laws, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 239, 249 (2004) (discussing limitations
Washington v. Davis imposes on disparate impact doctrine in terms of willful ignorance
about racism).
346. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 371 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
347. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 76 (Jossey-Bass 2007) ("Taken together with the LSSSE data, the
findings reported in After the JD provide indirect support for our belief - a central
contention of this book - that legal education could be significantly improved."). Note
that the After the JD study is also an important source for Sander, who chooses to
interpret it without considering its implications for the quality of teaching in law
schools. Sander, supra note 12, at 456.
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pack by abjuring race-based affirmative action. 348 His account is
entirely un-systemic, however, insofar as the only aspect of it that he
seriously examines is the practice of race-based affirmative action in
admissions. One could easily infer from Sander's article that no
significant issues exist with respect to other aspects of legal
education in the United States.
But even if he is correct to claim that the combination of UGPA
and LSAT score is an accurate predictor of law school
performance, 349 that only begs the question: what does a student
demonstrate when she, or, more likely, he, performs well in law
school? Given data such as Lani Guinier's showing that women
consistently underperform as law students relative to their
admissions credentials, 350 what reason do we have to doubt that a
significant part of the problem for African-American law students,
male or female, is the failure of their professors to think and act
carefully toward the goal of ensuring that they use teaching
techniques that will conduce to the success of those students?
Again, this is a structuralist point, meaning that what law
professors intend is only part of the issue, although law professors
have more control over this situation than most small groups have
over important social issues. Sander takes law professors' teaching
techniques for granted, 351 and he takes various steps to try to
insulate his analysis from obvious questions about the impact
teaching techniques might have on the phenomena he claims to
describe. 352 But the design of the law school classes that Sander
takes as ordinary, in which the institution requires professors to
348. Sander, supra note 12, at 369.
349. Id. at 421.
350. Id. at 424 ("A number of careful studies, stretching back into the 1970s, have
demonstrated that average black performance in the first year of law school does not
exceed levels predicted by academic indicators. If anything, blacks tend to
underperform in law school relative to their numbers, a trend that holds true for other
graduate programs and undergraduate colleges."). See also, Johnson & Onwuachi-
Willig, supra note 12.
351. Sander, supra note 12, at 432.
352. Id. at 424 ("While I would not completely discount the influence of personal
biases among professors, I believe that in the generally progressive world of law schools
the net effect of bias is unlikely to be a net disadvantage for blacks."). But see Krieger,
supra note 51. Krieger uses empirical evidence from cognitive psychology to
demonstrate that humans are capable of significant discrimination based on cognition,
rather than motivation. Id. at 1164. One of the chief virtues she asserts for her approach
is that it allows for more productive dialog between persons who claim discrimination
and the persons who allegedly engaged in discrimination, not least because it offers an
explanation for discriminatory conduct that does not require the attribution of malice to
the persons who allegedly discriminated. Id. at 1163, 1165, 1213. Note also the studies
Krieger reports that support Michigan Law's "critical mass" claim. Id. at 1193.
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achieve a predetermined curve in assigning final grades, 353 virtually
assures that professors will rarely invest much energy in thinking
about ways to improve the learning of the students at the left tail of
the curve. One could point out that this creates a perverse incentive
for affirmative action: a student population that will reliably occupy
the left tail, pushing most of their peers upward on the curve. 354
But one could equally ask if the purpose of classroom
instruction in law schools is to help students learn, or to establish a
quick-reference guide for potential employers. Just as abandoning
the LSAT for a Pre-Start or similar program might be prohibitive for
law schools, so finding some other way of evaluating job applicants
might prove prohibitive for law firms. At the moment, anyway,
most firms seem happy enough with the current system of ranking
law students.
Conclusion
The continuing statistical underperformance on standardized
tests and in university classes by African Americans that Sander and
others have described could indicate some deficiency on the part of
African Americans. It could as easily - indeed, given the history of
slavery and segregation, it could much more plausibly - indicate
some deficiency on the part of the testing and education systems.
Or, it could indicate a form of on-going success by African
Americans. In order to survive slavery and segregation, African
Americans must have developed cultural forms that would allow
them simultaneously to understand white people and to conceal
important elements of their thinking from white people. 355 Perhaps,
only two generations after the end of legal segregation, the cultural
divide continues to operate sufficiently to undermine African
Americans' aggregate academic performance in predominantly
white institutions. 356
353. Sander, supra note 12, at 432.
354. Sander describes this as an outcome, if not an incentive. Id. at 481.
355. See PETER J. PARISH, SLAVERY: HISTORY AND HISTORIANS (Westview Press 1989)
(presenting an overview of historians' changing understandings of how slaves and their
descendents adapted to slavery).
356. See THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 16, at 23 ("Upwardly mobile
parents often raise their children the way they themselves were raised. Phillips and her
colleagues find that racial differences in parenting practices are partly traceable to the
fact that even when black and white parents have the same test scores, educational
attainment, income, wealth, and number of children, black parents are likely to have
grown up in less advantaged households. Phillips and her colleagues also find that this
can lower black children's test scores. In other words, it can take more than one
generation for successful families to adopt the 'middle-class' parenting practices that
[Vol. 5
Justice Thomas apparently believes that, whatever description
of the problem one chooses, given the end of legal segregation, the
only reasonable solution is to leave African Americans to compete
on formally equal terms with everyone else and let them catch up
gradually. Sander seems to provide specific evidence for Thomas'
general argument in his Grutter dissent: white people's effort to
make up for the harms of slavery and segregation through
affirmative action do more harm than good. Sander's solution
parallels Thomas's solution just as their critiques parallel: if
affirmative action is the problem, then all we need to do is get rid of
it.
Perhaps the most important limitation in Sander's statistical
analysis is that it fails to capture the entirety of what affirmative
action tries to accomplish and the fullness of its potential effects.
The historical example of Pre-Start may indicate a significant
inadequacy in modern affirmative action programs, but if it does,
then it also indicates what such programs could become with the
right motivation and creativity. Johnson saw that, as the site of the
worst discrimination against African Americans, and the home to
the largest population of African Americans, the South has a
particular responsibility to remedy past wrongs, and that
affirmative action in legal education at southern universities is a
logical and, in all likelihood, highly effective means to achieve that
remedy. The only real question is the date for the sunset.
In his Grutter dissent, Justice Thomas suggests that the
University of Michigan Law School could achieve the racial mix it
wants among its student population simply by lowering admission
standards to the point at which a suitable percentage of racial and
ethnic minority students would qualify for admission without
affirmative action. Among the various problems with this argument
is that it fails to appreciate the extent to which managing a law
school, like managing any institution, is often a matter of balancing
competing priorities. Perhaps the most important lesson from Pre-
Start is the example of a law school dean who aspired to improve
dramatically the stature of his law school, and saw that improving
the credentials of the school's students was an essential part of that
seem most likely to increase children's cognitive skills"). "Family life is known to play a
more important role in explaining a child's educational achievement than any school-
related factors. Analyses have repeatedly found that mother's education, father's
education, the number of siblings in the family (fewer is better), family income, family
health care, the number of books in the home, and other, less easily measured
characteristics (such as parental relationships with the child) together have a major
impact on student achievement. Of all these factors, the educational attainment of the
mother seems to be the single most important, because it so directly affects the care the
child receives at home." Peterson, supra note 127, at 10.
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goal, but who at the same time also instituted an affirmative action
program that had the effect of admitting students with credentials
that were well below the school's usual norms. This decision must
have been either a reflection of Johnson's belief that universities
meet their intellectual obligations only insofar as they also meet
certain moral obligations, or that race-based affirmative action is
consistent with increasing intellectual rigor, or both.
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, and Professor Sander,
attribute duplicity to law school administrators in their use of
affirmative action. Justices Thomas and Scalia attribute cynicism.
Ben Johnson was neither duplicitous nor cynical. Even if we accept
Sander's proposition that Bakke had the effect of leading law schools
to continue using illegal methods of affirmative action, but to
conceal that fact, such action was impossible for Johnson. Pre-Start
ended well before the Bakke decision.
Thomas and Scalia assert that we cannot distinguish benign
from invidious uses of racial classifications. They joined Rehnquist
and Kennedy in asserting that the Grutter majority's scrutiny of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action program was strict only in
name, not in fact. This article effectively performs strict scrutiny
post hoc on Pre-Start. Anyone who opposes affirmative action in
principle will likely find the story of Pre-Start irrelevant. For
anyone who is interested in using empirical evidence to evaluate the
issue, however, Pre-Start demonstrates that law school
administrators and faculty are capable of making good-faith use of
racial classifications as part of the goal of correcting for the nation's
sorry history of racial discrimination.
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